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INTRODUCTION
The equality of creditors norm is widely viewed as the single most important
principle in American bankruptcy law, rivaled only by our commitment to a
fresh start for honest but unfortunate debtors.1 Equality of creditors teaches that
similarly situated creditors should be treated similarly. Thus if one general
creditor will be paid 25% of what it is owed, others also should receive 25%.
A glance at any bankruptcy casebook confirms the centrality of the
principle. The leading casebook assures its readers that the trustee in a
bankruptcy case “stands for the proposition that equity is equality.”2 “That
maxim,” the authors explain, “means that unless a creditor can clearly
demonstrate that it deserves some priority in the bankruptcy payout, the
trustee will assume all creditors are equal and try to maximize the pot for that
collective.”3 “By treating all unsecured creditors the same,” they say, in
another of their numerous references to the principle, “that is, for all to collect
a pro rata share of whatever is available for distribution . . . bankruptcy
reinforces the goal of equality among these unsecured creditors.”4
1 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
483, 483 (1997) (describing “a ‘fresh start’ for debtors and equality of distribution for creditors” as
“the two competing goals of consumer bankruptcy”). Back in her law professor days, Elizabeth
Warren once said she knew that the students in her Bankruptcy class could identify equality of
creditors as a central goal of bankruptcy in their sleep because she had quite literally heard them do
it in the classes she taught at 8:30 in the morning. Id. at 483 n.1.
2 ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 58 (7th ed. 2014).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 133. In our casebook, Dan Bussel and I also reference the equality of creditors principle
with some regularity. See, e.g., DANIEL J. BUSSEL & DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., BANKRUPTCY 89 (10th

2017]

The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors”

701

Yet if we look at current bankruptcy practice, creditor equality seems to be
rapidly disappearing. Bankruptcy courts often bless arrangements that give one
group of general creditors starkly different treatment than other groups. In the
Chrysler bankruptcy, Chrysler’s retirees, trade creditors, tort creditors, and the
unsecured portion of its senior bondholders’ claims all had general unsecured
claims. If the equality of creditors principle were vigorously pursued, we would
expect each to receive roughly the same recovery. But they did not. The retirees
and trade creditors were paid in full, or nearly so, while tort creditors and the
bondholders’ deficiency claims received almost nothing.5 Parallel patterns can
be seen in the ordinary run of cases as well. In many recent cases, debtors have
used restructuring support agreements to secure the approval of creditors,
sometimes offering side payments to creditors if they sign the agreement, but
not to creditors that decline to sign.6 As a result of these maneuvers, the
recoveries of seemingly similar creditors are often widely divergent.
Ironically, equality’s disappearance in bankruptcy occurred as equality
ascended in other contexts, as reflected most recently in the success of the
movement for same-sex marriage.7 Equality sometimes seems to be the central
principle in American life, but in bankruptcy it is rapidly losing purchase.
These developments have attracted surprisingly little attention in the
scholarly literature thus far. Almost the only exception is a recent article by
Mark Roe and Fred Tung.8 Analyzing creditors’ efforts to obtain special status
through legislation or transactional innovation, Roe and Tung characterize
the heightened protection as “priority jumps.”9 Their particular concern is the
interest group dynamic that enables some creditors—especially large financial
institutions—to secure priority for their claims in recent bankruptcy cases.10
ed. 2015) (noting the view “that bankruptcy policies of fresh start for the debtor and equality of
treatment for creditors, on balance, outweigh any nonbankruptcy policies that support specific
performance of covenants not to compete”).
5 Chrysler’s $5.3 billion of trade creditors were promised payment in full by “New Chrysler.”
The retirees, who were owed $10 billion for their health benefits, received a $4.6 billion note and
55% of the New Chrysler stock. Other general creditors received little or nothing. See Mark J. Roe
& David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 733 (2010).
6 For an analysis of side agreements in bankruptcy and proposals for policing them, see
generally Kenneth Ayotte et al., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 255 (2017).
7 Interestingly, much of the ascendency has taken place outside of the equal protection clause.
See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (2011) (describing the
Supreme Court’s movement away from “group-based equality claims under the guarantees of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to individual liberty claims under the due process guarantees of
the [same a]mendments” (footnotes omitted)).
8 Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the
Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2013).
9 Id. at 1238.
10 Id. Roe and Tung do not consider the influence in bankruptcy of other interest groups, including
bankruptcy professionals. For more on that constituency, see Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the
Bankruptcy Reform of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 82-84 (1997), which describes the influence of bankruptcy
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My focus in this Article is somewhat different. My concern is with the shifting
treatment of general creditors, and with the rhetorical power of bankruptcy’s
“equality of creditors” principle, which does not come into play in the “priority
jump” analysis. I analyze the questions of priority that do arise in terms of their
implications for (horizontal) relations among creditors with the same priority and
ask what these and other developments mean for the “very policy and object of
the bankrupt law,”11 as one early court put it, or, as another court put it, the
“cardinal purpose of the legislation [that] must never be overlooked.”12
The erosion of creditor equality in recent practice raises two questions that lie
at the heart of this Article: How difficult would it be to resuscitate equality of
creditors? And just how beneficial would the project be? The good news is that
reinvigorating equality would be surprisingly easy. Although several of the recent
departures from equality would require legislative reform to correct, others would
not. And in each case, the adjustments would be quite straightforward.13
The problem is that the equality norm itself contributes nothing to the
analysis. As we begin to assess whether equal treatment would be beneficial in
each of the doctrinal contexts, it quickly becomes clear that the key considerations
lie elsewhere—with concerns such as curbing self-dealing or secret liens,14 and
maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate. Although equality originally served as
a rough proxy for some of these issues, this is no longer the case. In some contexts,
the equality language is unnecessary but harmless. But in others, its historical
pedigree and rhetorical resonance have been pernicious. If chicken soup can’t hurt
and may help a person who has a cold, the equality norm is the opposite: in current
bankruptcy practice, it can’t help—and it may (and does) hurt.
I begin (in Part I) by attempting to discover where the equality norm came
from. The first place to look is the English predecessors to the earliest
American bankruptcy laws. Hints of the equality principle can be found in the
early English cases, and creditor equality was given a ringing endorsement in
America in an influential 1807 case.15 That case, like many of the cases that
followed, involved preferences—payments or transfers made to a favored
creditor shortly before bankruptcy—which were condemned as a violation of
lawyers on the 1978 Code, and David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J.
321, 336-40 (1999), which describes the evolution of the bankruptcy bar in assuring the permanence of federal
bankruptcy law.
11 Harrison v. McLaren, 11 F. Cas. 654, 657 (S.D. Miss. 1874) (No. 6139).
12 Linkman v. Wilcox, 15 F. Cas. 561, 562 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1871) (No. 8374).
13 See discussion infra Section III.A.
14 A “secret lien” is a priority not reflected in a statute or the UCC filing system, and which may
therefore come as a surprise to other creditors. For more, see Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract
Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 106-09 (2009), which discusses the classic case of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
15 Locke v. Winning, 3 Mass. (1 Tyng.) 325, 326 (Mass. 1807) (opinion of Sedgwick, J.) (“A
principal object of the bankrupt law is that the property of the bankrupt in all his estate . . . [is] to
be equally distributed among his creditors, in proportion to the sums respectively due to them.”).
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the equality of creditors principle. Under the 1841, 1867, and 1898 Acts,
preferences could be retrieved from creditors who received them, and a debtor
that had made a preferential payment could be denied access to bankruptcy.16
Throughout the nineteenth century, the domain of the equality of
creditors was limited to individual and small business bankruptcy cases. The
principle played little role in reorganization cases involving substantial
corporations, for reasons explored at the end of Part I. After Congress finally
codified large-scale corporate reorganization in 1933 and 1934, however, the
norm quickly spread to these cases as well. As with many central bankruptcy
issues in the 1930s and 1940s, Justice William Douglas played a key role in the
diffusion of the norm throughout all of American bankruptcy law.
After tracing the historical origins of creditor equality, I ask (in Part II) how
debtors and favored creditors so often manage to circumvent the equality norm.
It turns out that current bankruptcy law provides numerous devices for
privileging one creditor or group of creditors over others. I briefly describe five
of the most important. The strategies range from transferring value to the
creditor prior to bankruptcy, to assuming the creditor’s contract in bankruptcy,
or to proposing to pay the creditor more than another class of unsecured
creditors in connection with a plan of reorganization.17
If courts and lawmakers were committed to promoting equality, they could
clamp down on each of these strategies for evasion. Briefly revisiting each, I
consider (in Part III) how equality might be enhanced. In each context, courts
or lawmakers could reinvigorate equality by making simple adjustments to
existing doctrine. Lawmakers could remove the safe harbors that protect many
preferences from avoidance, for instance, and courts could prohibit the special
treatment of “critical vendors” and tighten the rules for classification of claims.
The question (the focus of Part IV) is whether reinvigorating the equality
of creditors norm would improve bankruptcy law. I conclude that it would not.
Equality does not appear to be the central concern with any of the doctrines I
consider. In each context, the real issues, as noted above, are policing selfdealing, reducing the risk of “secret liens,” or maximizing the value of the
debtor’s assets.18 The case for retaining a vestige of the equality norm is slightly
stronger in consumer cases and Chapter 7 liquidations, since these cases more
16 Under current bankruptcy law, payments within ninety days of bankruptcy may be deemed
to be preferences retrievable by the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2012).
17 For simplicity, I will describe the debtor as the one who is evading equality, but in practice
the departures from equality are often triggered by pressure from creditors.
18 For a critique of the equality (or “pari passu”) principle in United Kingdom law on somewhat different
grounds, see Rizwaan Jameel Mokal, Consistency of Principle in Corporate Insolvency 116-161 (Dec. 2001)
(unpublished thesis, University College London), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
303722 [https://perma.cc/XN9K-JEGA], which emphasizes the plethora of special priorities and lack of payout
for general creditors in most U.K. cases, and argues that preference law is unrelated to the pari passu principle.
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closely resemble the context in which equality of creditors first emerged. But
creditor equality does not play a meaningful role in practice even there.
In the final Part of the Article, I ask whether there are any other reasons for
retaining the equality of creditors norm despite its apparent obsolescence. As I
address this question, I consider the most compelling responses to the famous
article referenced in my title,19 as applied to the very different bankruptcy
context. None provides a plausible basis for a renewed commitment to equality
in bankruptcy. The equality principle should be abandoned.
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE EQUALITY NORM
Like many features of American bankruptcy, the equality of creditors maxim
came to these shores as a transplant from earlier English insolvency law but
quickly took on a distinctly American coloration. Equality of creditors figured
quite prominently in debates over traditional bankruptcy—that is, the bankruptcy
of individuals and small businesses. It played much less of a role in large scale
reorganizations, which took place outside of bankruptcy until the 1930s. During
the twentieth century, however, the equality norm colonized that context too. The
discussion that follows considers each of these developments in turn.
A. Equality in Traditional Bankruptcy
Modern American bankruptcy law traces its origins back to English
bankruptcy laws enacted in 1543 and 1571, together with a 1704 law that gave
debtors a permanent discharge from their obligations for the first time.20 In
the debates over bankruptcy and in the caselaw interpreting the early statutes,
there are occasional hints of an equality of creditors principle. In a 1758 case
called Worsley v. DeMattos, for instance, Lord Mansfield says that “[t]he policy
of the bankrupt law . . . is to level all creditors, who have not actually recovered
satisfaction, or got hold of a pledge which the bankrupt could not defeat.”21

19
20

Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
For a succinct history of the evolution of English and American bankruptcy legislation, see
generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
21 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 416; 1 Burr. 467, 484 (emphasis added). Sir Edward Coke also had gestured at
the equality objective in a much earlier opinion. In The Case of Bankrupts (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 441, 473; 2
Co. Rep. 24b, 25a-26a, he wrote that “if, after the debtor becomes a bankrupt, he may prefer one (who
peradventure hath least need), and defeat and defraud many other poor men of their true debts, it would
be unequal and unconscionable, and a great defect in the law.” For contemporary expressions of the
equality principle in English law, see, e.g., ROY GOODE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
LAW 142 (2d ed. 1997), which describes the equal treatment rule as “all-pervasive,” and Vanessa Finch,
Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?, 62 MOD. L. REV. 633, 634 (1999), which notes that “the
normal rule in a corporate insolvency is that all creditors are treated on an equal footing.”
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In both England and America, the principal concern of the early bankruptcy
laws was debtors’ temptation to flee their creditors or, if they stayed, to secretly
transfer assets to family members or favored creditors.22 To discourage this
temptation, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, America’s first federal bankruptcy law,
permitted creditors to file a bankruptcy petition against a merchant or trader
who, “with intent unlawfully to delay or defraud his or her creditors, depart[ed]
from the state in which such person usually resides, or remain[ed] absent
therefrom, or conceal[ed] him or herself therein.”23 Similarly, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1841, the second federal bankruptcy law, authorized creditors to file a
petition if a merchant or banker left his state “with intent to defraud his
creditors,” or “conceal[ed] himself to avoid being arrested,” or concealed assets.24
Bankruptcy advocates envisioned that the assets of an insolvent debtor
would be turned over to a trustee or assignee at or near the time the debtor
committed an “act of bankruptcy.”25 The trustee or assignee would then sell
the assets and distribute the proceeds to the debtor’s creditors. In return for
fully cooperating, the debtor would no longer be responsible for his
prebankruptcy obligations; they would be discharged.26
The equality of creditors norm emerged as an increasingly important
feature of this story. “A principal object of the bankrupt law,” as an 1807
Massachusetts decision put it,
is that the property of the bankrupt in all his estate, at the time of the act of
bankruptcy, by that act shall cease; and at the same time, by relation, vest in
the assignee; to be equally distributed among his creditors, in proportion to
the sums respectively due to them.27

22 In an influential 1697 tract defending bankruptcy relief for troubled debtors, the novelist
Daniel Defoe acknowledged that debtors currently were tempted to abscond. D. DEFOE, AN ESSAY
UPON PROJECTS 198 (1697) (noting that “no Statute can reach [a merchant debtor’s] Effects beyond
the Seas; so that he has nothing to secure but his Books, and away he goes into the Friars”); see also
PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 12-13 (1974) (describing the
principal objectives of colonial bankruptcy laws as halting “races to the courthouse,” policing fraud,
ensuring an equitable division of assets, and providing relief to debtors).
23 National Bankrupt Act, § 1 (1800) (repealed 1803); see also COLEMAN, supra note 22, at 19-20
(describing enactment and repeal of the 1800 Act).
24 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 442 (1841) (repealed 1843).
25 In early bankruptcy law, acts of bankruptcy included fraudulent conveyances of property and
other activities that suggested the debtor was evading payment of his obligations. But the category
later expanded to include events suggesting the debtor might be insolvent, such as a creditor’s
obtaining a judicial lien. For discussion, see Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant
Character, and the History of the Voidable Peference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 34-39 (1986).
26 See, e.g., EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, NAVIGATING FAILURE 70 (2001) (describing commercial moralists’
view that troubled debtors should immediately disclose their financial distress and surrender their assets for
sale and distribution to their creditors, and that creditors should then willingly discharge the obligations).
27 Locke v. Winning, 3 Mass. (1 Tyng.) 325, 326 (opinion of Sedgwick, J.).
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In that case, the debtor had transferred “certain promissory notes” to one
of his creditors as collateral the day before committing an act of bankruptcy.
Because the transfer occurred in contemplation of bankruptcy, the court
invalidated the transfer as “a fraud against the law, and therefore void.”28
The early federal bankruptcy laws did not impose a blanket prohibition on
prebankruptcy transfers. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, the first bankruptcy law to
permit voluntary bankruptcy filings, invalidated transfers made “for the purpose”
of giving a preference within two months of a bankruptcy filing, thus limiting the
prohibition to intentional preferences.29 The restriction implied that fraud was the
principal concern and equality was secondary with prebankruptcy transactions.30
Under the 1867 Act, some district courts adopted a more single-minded focus on
creditor equality, construing a similarly worded preference provision as giving the
debtor an affirmative obligation to file for bankruptcy rather than permit a creditor
to obtain a prebankruptcy lien that would give that creditor priority over the
debtor’s other creditors.31 But the Supreme Court rejected these decisions, holding
that the trustee or assignee needed to provide some evidence that the debtor
intended to prefer the creditor.32 Equality meant that the debtor could not play

28 Id. at 326; see also Ogden v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 370, 372 (N.Y. 1806) (“It will not, however, be
permitted that a person, insolvent at the time, and contemplating an act of bankruptcy, should parcel
out his estate to such creditors as he may see fit to prefer; this is opposed to the very genius of the
bankrupt laws, which proceed upon a principle of equality and a just distribution.”).
29 § 2, 5 Stat. at 442. Justice Story was a key drafter of the 1841 Act. See, e.g., BALLEISEN, supra
note 26, at 114 (describing Story as “the most prominent judicial champion of the nation’s bankrupts”);
see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 385
(photo. reprint 1987) (1833) (“[T]he general object of all bankrupt and insolvent laws is, on the one
hand, to secure to creditors an appropriation of the property of their debtors, pro tanto . . . ; and, on the
other hand, to relieve unfortunate and honest debtors from perpetual bondage to their creditors . . . .”).
30 In practice, some intentional preferences also seem to have been widely permitted.
According to the leading historian of the 1841 Act,

[a]s American business culture developed in the decades that followed independence,
numerous participants in the credit system came to accept the proposition that all debts
were not equal. Two kinds of debts stood apart as imposing special obligations—money
that was borrowed without interest and debts that arose as a result of [guarantees of a
debtor’s obligation by a third party].
BALLEISEN, supra note 26, at 92. Because these creditors were “disinterested,” debtors were
permitted to pay them before other creditors. Id. at 93.
31 “It is said,” as the Supreme Court summarized the argument,
that the grand feature of th[e] law is to secure equality of distribution among creditors
in all cases of insolvency; and that, to secure this, it is the legal duty of the insolvent,
when sued by one creditor in an ordinary proceeding likely to end in judgment and
seizure of property, to file himself a petition of voluntary bankruptcy.
Wilson v. City Bank, 84 U.S. (1 Wall.) 473, 484-85 (1873).
32 Id. at 487.
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favorites among its creditors, and that each creditor should get a pro rata share of
the assets available as of the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy.33
Although the equality norm figured prominently in the federal bankruptcy
laws that were enacted,34 the status of bankruptcy itself was hotly disputed
throughout the nineteenth century, and federal bankruptcy laws were in place
for a total of less than two decades.35 Bankruptcy advocates, many of whom
lived in the commercial states of the Northeast, viewed bankruptcy as essential
to the development of commerce in America, and equality of creditors as a key
feature of a properly functioning bankruptcy law.36 Thomas Jefferson and other
bankruptcy critics in the South and West, by contrast, questioned the need for
a federal bankruptcy law; many critics insisted that it was perfectly appropriate
for debtors to pay some of their general creditors rather than others.37
In defending the prohibition on preferences, a leading advocate of the
legislation that eventually became the 1898 Act claimed that debtors themselves
were the real beneficiaries. “It is the debtor whose interest it is to secure absolute
equality in payment,” he insisted, because creditors will be more willing to lend
if they are confident that they will receive equal treatment.38 If debtors “will pay
their debts proportionately if they can not pay them in full, justly, man for man,

33 Weisberg suggests that the introduction of voluntary bankruptcy for the first time in 1841 played a
key role in the evolution of the equality norm. This “divorced bankruptcy from the English model of the
culpable act of the debtor,” and shifted the moral focus of bankruptcy to “creditor[s’] collegial duty to uphold
th[e] rather abstract collectivist spirit” reflected in the equality norm. See Weisberg, supra note 25, at 88.
34 Under the 1867 Act, which lasted considerably longer than the 1800 and 1841 Acts, courts
regularly referred to equality of creditors as a key principle. See, e.g., Harrison v. McLaren, 11 F. Cas.
654, 657 (S.D. Miss. 1874) (No. 6139) (characterizing “equality among creditors” as the “very policy
and object of the bankrupt[cy] law”); In re Hunt, 12 F. Cas. 900, 902 (D.N.J. 1871) (No. 6882)
(identifying “equality in the distribution of assets” as the “object of the law”).
35 The 1800 Act lasted until 1803, the 1841 Act until 1843, and the 1867 Act until 1878. The 1898
Act was the first permanent federal bankruptcy law. See COLEMAN, supra note 22, at 18.
36 Alexander Hamilton and later Daniel Webster were the best known advocates. See, e.g.,
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION 3, 26 (2001).
37 Id. at 3; see also BALLEISEN, supra note 26, at 14 (describing “two competing versions of
commercial morality—one premised on special financial obligations to one’s closest business associates,
and another, formulated by apostles of an integrated, national economy, that mandated equal treatment
to everyone in the marketplace”). In the absence of a federal bankruptcy law, many states permitted
insolvent debtors to assign their assets to some creditors but not to others. See, e.g., Grover v. Wakeman,
11 Wend. 187, 187 (N.Y. 1833) (“A debtor in failing circumstances may prefer one creditor or set of
creditors by assigning his property for their benefit, in exclusion of his other creditors, provided that
he devote the whole of the property assigned to the payment of his just debts; [and] that the assignment
be absolute and unconditional . . . .”); Niolon v. Douglas, 10 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 443, 448 (1836) (“The
insolvent laws of most of the States either allow the debtor to draw a distinction among his creditors,
in the very act of surrendering under the law itself, or sustain it if already done.”).
38 15 CONG. REC. 2963 (1884) (statement of Rep. Hoar).
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without exception or discrimination,” he predicted, “the pent-up accumulation
of capital will run over this country like a Mississippi flood.”39
Critics refused to concede that preferential payments are inherently
problematic. Congressman Bailey of Texas, who had proposed an alternative to
the bill that became the 1898 Act, criticized the assumption that “all debts shall
stand upon exactly the same footing.”40 “As for my part,” he countered, “I do not
believe that it is true in morals, and I do not believe that it ought be made true
in law, that all debts are of equal obligation.”41 Congressman Bailey then gave
two illustrations: “If I owed $5000 to a man who possessed nothing else and I
owed $25,000 to a man who was many times a millionaire,” he said, but he could
not pay both, he would not hesitate to pay the $5000 debt but not the $25,000.42
As finally enacted, the 1898 Act included a preference provision that took
roughly the same form as the provisions in the 1841 and 1867 Acts. The trustee
could retrieve any payments or other transfers made within four months of the
bankruptcy, so long as the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer and the
creditor “had reasonable cause to believe that [the transfer] was intended thereby
to give a preference.”43 The provision was important both because it was a victory
for advocates of creditor equality, and because the 1898 Act would prove to be the
nation’s first permanent bankruptcy law, escaping the early demise of its three
predecessors. Within a few years, defenders of intentionally preferential payments
would wane, and the equality norm would be embraced by nearly everyone.44
The 1913 Supreme Court case Clarke v. Rogers45 is a good illustration of (and
became the standard citation for) the vision of creditor equality that emerged. The
debtor in Clarke was a trustee of numerous trusts who transferred assets to two
trusts to which he owed money and then filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter.46
The question was whether these transfers amounted to preferences, enabling the
39 Id. “In order to do justice,” another congressman insisted a few years later, “the law should
compel an insolvent debtor, if he will not do it willingly, to distribute all his property—less his legal
exemptions—among all his creditors pro rata . . . . Unless he does this he perpetrates a moral if not
a legal fraud upon his creditors.” 26 CONG. REC. 44 (1893) (statement of Rep. Layton).
40 26 CONG. REC. 103 (1893).
41 Id.
42 Id. Similarly, Bailey argued, if the friend of a businessman has lent him money to help the
businessman through a period of financial distress, but the financial distress continues, the
businessman “will under all circumstances protect the man who loan[ed] him the money, not for
profit, but purely for the sake of helping him.” Id. Other lawmakers, particularly Democrats from
the South and West who opposed federal bankruptcy legislation, offered similar defenses of
preferential payments. See, e.g., 25 CONG. REC. 2874 (1893) (statement of Rep. Kyle).
43 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978). The actual language of the 1898
Act was more complicated than the description in the text suggests, because the insolvency requirement was
in one provision (60(a)) and the four month and “reasonable cause to believe” features in another (60(b)).
44 I consider the reasons for the shift in Section IV.A, infra.
45 228 U.S. 534.
46 Id. at 539-40.
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two trusts and their beneficiaries to receive more than the debtor’s other creditors.47
The debtor raised several legalistic but technically plausible defenses. He argued
that the trusts did not count as creditors for the purposes of the preference
provision because there was no contract, and that the preference provision only
covered transfers from the debtor to someone else, not the debtor to himself (as
trustee of the trusts).48 The lower courts had swept these arguments aside. “[W]hile
giving attention to the technical elements of appellant’s arguments,” as the
Supreme Court put it, the trial and appellate courts “cut through them to apply the
fundamental purpose of the Bankruptcy Law, that is, equality between creditors.”49
The Supreme Court fully endorsed this approach. “Equality between creditors is
necessarily the ultimate aim of the Bankrupt Law,” the Court said, “and to obtain it
we must regard the essential nature of transactions, not their forms or accidents.”50
B. The “Fair and Equitable” Requirement in Railroad Reorganizations
During the same period that the equality principle took shape in
traditional bankruptcy cases, Wall Street banks and law firms developed an
approach for reorganizing large-scale corporations that became known as
railroad or equity receivership.51 “Equity” initially meant something quite
different in this context than in ordinary bankruptcy.
The equity receivership arose as a result of the railroad failures of the middle
and late nineteenth century. Many of the large railroads were cobbled together
from mergers between smaller railroads as the system rapidly expanded in the
nineteenth century.52 When large railroads failed, everyone agreed they should
be reorganized rather than liquidated. Even secured creditors, despite having
the least to gain from reorganization, favored it because a railroad’s capital
structure often consisted of a jumble of different bonds with mortgages on
different parts of the railroads’ assets.53 Bondholders who held a mortgage on,
47 Id. at 542 (quoting § 60(b), 30 Stat. at 562) (“A person shall be deemed to have given a
preference, if, being insolvent, he has within four months before the filing of the petition, . . . made
a transfer . . . to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any
other of such creditors of the same class.” (first omission in original)).
48 Id. at 542-44. The debtor’s argument was plausible because the Bankruptcy Act defined
“creditor” narrowly, including only those who had “provable claims” against the debtor. See id.
49 Id. at 544.
50 Id. at 548.
51 The origins of the equity receivership are described much more fully in SKEEL, supra note
36, at 56-69.
52 The railroad story has been well told in a number of popular histories. For an entertaining
account of the famous battle to take control of the key Erie Railway, see generally JOHN STEELE
GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET (1988).
53 As the business historian Albro Martin put it, speaking of the 1884 Wabash receivership,
“only a financial wizard, with plenty of time and money at his disposal, could have sorted out the
property represented by the [railroad’s] mortgages.” Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity
Receivership: An Essay on Institutional Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 699 (1974).
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say, the Indiana tracks of a railroad that traversed Indiana and three other states
would not recover much if the railroad were shut down.
Despite every constituency’s support for reorganization and the perceived
public interest in access to railroad transportation, it was far from clear that
either Congress or the states could enact restructuring provisions for the
railroads due to, among other things, perceived constitutional obstacles.54 The
railroad reorganizers and the judges before whom they appeared devised an
ingenious solution: Creditors would ask the court to appoint a receiver to take
charge of the railroad’s property and to begin foreclosure proceedings, and
while the foreclosure was pending, the Wall Street banks that had sold the
railroad’s bonds and stock would organize committees to represent the different
classes of bonds and stock.55 The committees would negotiate the terms of a
reorganization with the railroad’s managers.56 When they had agreed on the
reorganization, they would form a single committee—the reorganization
committee—that would be the only bidder at the eventual foreclosure sale.57 Its
bid would consist of the old bonds and stock that had been deposited with the
committee, together with cash to pay those who had declined to deposit their
securities.58 Until 1933, when it was finally codified by Congress,59 railroad
receivership took place entirely in the courts, outside of the bankruptcy process.
The capital structure of a substantial railroad was like a messy layer cake.
Rather than consisting primarily of general creditors, all of whom had the same
priority, railroads had different classes of creditors with claims to different assets.60
As a result, the controversies that arose tended to focus less on the treatment of
similarly situated creditors—the classic equality of creditors concern—and more
on how creditors and shareholders that occupied different layers of the priority
hierarchy should be treated vis-à-vis one another. The disputes were vertical rather
than horizontal. These cases were far removed from traditional bankruptcy, with
its handful of creditors getting their pro rata share of a pot of assets.

54 See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 36, at 52-56 (noting that it was not clear Congress’s bankruptcy
powers extended to corporations, that the Commerce Clause was narrowly construed during this
period, and that states could not regulate beyond their borders).
55 For a detailed overview of the process by a leading early twentieth-century lawyer, see
generally Paul D. Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations; Bondholders’ and Stockholders Protective
Committees; Reorganization Committees; and the Voluntary Recapitalization of Corporations, in SOME
LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION 153 (1917).
56 Id.
57 See id. at 204-05 (describing one case where the reorganizers “spent a great many anxious
hours preparing for the unexpected bidder,” but that such bidders never appeared).
58 Id.
59 See Act of Mar. 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-240, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (repealed 1938)
(providing for statutory railroad reorganization process).
60 See Martin, supra note 53, at 699.

2017]

The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors”

711

The key issue that emerged was whether a reorganization plan could
permit shareholders to retain an interest in the reorganized company while
excluding a creditor who was junior in priority to the bondholders but senior
to shareholders. In 1913, the same year as its Clarke decision, the Supreme
Court held in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd that an ordinary creditor
could not simply be excluded from a receivership that permitted shareholders
to retain an ownership interest.61 Equity in this context was a question of
priority, not the treatment of two or more general creditors.
Courts had earlier addressed the question whether a debtor could pay some of
its suppliers in full. Because all of the railroad’s assets were usually subject to
mortgages, this too was a question of priority rather than of equality among general
creditors. In Fosdick v. Schall, the Supreme Court upheld payments to a train car
supplier, despite the mortgagee’s property interest in the railroad’s assets.62
According to the Court, “[e]very railroad mortgagee in accepting his security
impliedly agrees that the current debts made in the ordinary course of business
shall be paid from the current receipts before he has any claim upon the income.”63
When Congress finally codified large scale reorganization in the 1930s, the
reorganization provisions continued to reflect this emphasis on vertical
hierarchy. Under sections 77 and 77B, which codified railroad reorganization in
1933 and reorganization for other large corporations in 1934, Congress permitted
confirmation of a reorganization plan only if it was “equitable” and “[did] not
discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders.”64 In 1938,
Congress completely revised the Bankruptcy Act, and enacted an entirely new
framework for reorganizing large corporations. The new framework, known as
Chapter X, adopted a simplified version of the earlier provision, requiring that
reorganization plans be “fair and equitable, and feasible.”65
The phrase “fair and equitable” does not immediately bring vertical hierarchy
or layer cakes to mind (and certainly could be construed as implicating horizontal
equality of creditors concerns), but the Supreme Court quickly decided that
priority was its primary focus. In 1939, the Court held, in an opinion by Justice
Douglas, that the “fair and equitable” standard required strict adherence to the
absolute priority rule, which requires that higher priority creditors be paid in full
before lower priority creditors or shareholders receive any recovery.66 The equity

61
62

228 U.S. 482, 508.
99 U.S. 235, 255 (1878) (holding that the supplier could retain the payments it had received but
that it was not entitled to additional payment from funds received in connection with the receivership).
63 Id. at 252.
64 § 77(g)(1), 204 Stat. at 1479.
65 Act of June 22, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, § 221(2), 52 Stat. 840, 897 (repealed 1978).
66 Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 117 (1939).
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receivership cases from which the standard emerged, he concluded, “dealt with the
precedence to be accorded creditors over stockholders in reorganization plans.”67
Although equity meant priority in large scale reorganization, not equality
among similarly situated creditors, the equality of creditors principle seeped
into corporate reorganization after 1938. There are at least two reasons for the
expansion. First, before large scale corporate reorganization was added to the
Bankruptcy Act, the provisions most closely associated with equality of
creditors—such as the preference provision—did not apply to large scale
corporate reorganization.68 After codification, the preference provision and
other bankruptcy provisions applied to large corporate debtors, just as they
did with traditional bankruptcy debtors. The 1930s amendments grafted large
scale corporate reorganization onto the structure that had given rise to the
equality of creditors principle.
Second, a shift in the capital structure of large scale reorganizations may also
have played a role. By the 1930s, the largest corporate debtors were increasingly
likely to be nonrailroads rather than railroads.69 Nonrailroads had fewer classes
of debt, and more uncollateralized debt—they did not have the same messy layer
cake structure as the railroads.70 Over time, disputes among different unsecured
creditors became more central than in the equity receivership.
The provision that most directly reflects this increasing horizontal focus is
a requirement that Congress included in its 1933 and 1934 corporate
bankruptcy legislation, but deleted in 1938: the requirement that a
reorganization not “discriminate unfairly.”71 As originally enacted, the unfair
discrimination requirement seems to have been primarily concerned with
vertical fairness—that is, that a higher priority class not be mistreated as
compared to a lower priority class, as in the Boyd case.72 In 1938, Congress
removed the unfair discrimination requirement from large scale corporate
reorganization, apparently concluding that “unfair discrimination” concerns
were subsumed in the “fair and equitable” requirement.73 But the “unfair
67
68

Id. at 115-16.
See supra text accompanying note 59. Although a few states had preference provisions, most
did not, and some of the provisions that did exist only applied when a state law insolvency regime
was invoked. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 492-93 (1994).
69 See Herbert R. Northrup, The Failure of the Teamsters’ Union to Win Railroad-Type Labor
Protection for Mergers or Deregulation, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 365, 367 (1995).
70 See generally Efraim Benmelech et al., The Mysterious Decline of Secured Debt (2016)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (documenting declining use of secured debt
throughout the twentieth century).
71 See supra text accompanying note 64.
72 Cf. supra note 61 and accompanying text.
73 See S. REP. No. 75-1916, at 35-36 (1938) (“Implicit in [‘fair and equitable’] is a prohibition
against any unfair discrimination in the plan in favor of any creditors or stockholders and the express
statement to that effect in Section 77B is therefore unnecessary.”).
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discrimination” requirement was never excised from the municipal bankruptcy
chapter. In that context, it was soon construed in horizontal terms.
In two municipal bankruptcy cases in the 1940s, Justice Douglas explicitly
linked the unfair discrimination requirement to equality of creditors, on each
occasion citing Clarke v. Rogers.74 In American United Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. City of Avon Park, the Court invalidated a Chapter IX plan that had been
approved by a substantial majority of the town’s creditors because of the plan’s
treatment of claims held by the town’s fiscal agent.75 Because the fiscal agent
was given a commission, it received a “special favor or inducement” not
available to other creditors, in violation of the “general rule of ‘equality between
creditors,’” which “has been embedded by Congress in Ch. IX by the express
prohibition against unfair discrimination.”76 In Mason v. Paradise Irrigation
District, the Court concluded that the equality between creditors principle was
not violated when the Reconstruction Finance Corporation received more
favorable treatment than other bondholders.77 Justice Douglas pointed out that
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had financed the restructuring, and
that “[i]t has long been recognized in reorganization law that those who put
new money into the distressed enterprise may be given a participation in the
reorganization plan reasonably equivalent to their contribution.”78
When Congress enacted the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it
reintroduced unfair discrimination into corporate reorganization.79 In addition to
permitting confirmation of reorganization plans that every class of creditors and
shareholders votes to approve, Chapter 11 provides for cramdown of a plan over
the objection of a dissenting class if the plan “does not discriminate unfairly” and
is “fair and equitable” with respect to the dissenting class or classes.80 The unfair
discrimination requirement has been consistently construed as concerned
primarily with the treatment of classes of creditors with the same priority—that
is, with horizontal equity, and as reflecting the equality of creditors principle.81
*

74
75
76
77
78
79

*

*

228 U.S. 534 (1913).
311 U.S. 138, 138 (1940).
Id. at 147 (citing Clarke, 228 U.S. at 548).
326 U.S. 536, 541 (1946) (citing Clarke, 228 U.S. at 548).
Id. at 541-42.
See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 227, 236-39 (1998).
80 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012).
81 See, e.g., Markell, supra note 79, at 227-28 (“[U]nfair discrimination is best viewed as a
horizontal limit on nonconsensual confirmation, in contrast to the vertical limit imposed by the
requirement that a nonconsensual plan be ‘fair and equitable.’”).
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By the middle of the twentieth century, the equality of creditors meme
pervaded bankruptcy law. It was seen as reflected in the preference provision, in
the general rule that unsecured creditors are entitled to a pro rata share of the
debtor’s assets, and in the prohibition on unfair discrimination. Courts that refuse
to enforce a covenant not to compete in bankruptcy (and commentators who
advocate this position) also have pointed to the equality of creditors norm,
reasoning that the covenant would effectively pay its beneficiary in full, while
other creditors would be getting far less.82 As Justice Robert Jackson once said
about the First Amendment, if there is one polestar in the bankruptcy firmament,
it is the equality of creditors principle.83 It is the principal constant of American
bankruptcy law, the starting point and central theme of the bankruptcy process.
At least in theory. In practice, it can be, and is, easily evaded.
II. WAYS TO EVADE THE “EQUALITY OF CREDITORS” NORM
Paul Simon once wrote a song proclaiming that “there must be fifty ways
to leave your lover.”84 (“You just slip out the back, Jack,” and “make a new
plan, Stan.”85) The equality of creditors norm suffers from the same
vulnerability as the unsuspecting lovers in Simon’s song. In current practice,
the most notable feature of the equality of creditors norm is how easily a
debtor can evade it. Although there may not be fifty ways to sidestep the
norm, the modes of escape are quite numerous.
This Part briefly chronicles five (or six) of the most common ways that
the equal treatment norm is flouted in current practice. Each is widespread,
and the use of all but the first appears to have sharply increased in recent
years. Although I will speak of the debtor as the one who is evading the
equality norm, debtors often do so under direct pressure from a creditor.
A. Evading the Preference Provision
Suppose that Firm owes $50,000 to Creditor A and also owes $50,000 to
Creditor B; both are unsecured, but Firm would really like to favor Creditor
A. If Firm repays Creditor A shortly before filing for bankruptcy (or gives
82 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 227, 279 (1989) (“[I]t would be ironic if [the beneficiary of a covenant not to compete] got, in
effect, full payment because its [equitable] claim could not be calculated, while those with clearly
defined losses were left in the cold.”).
83 Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can perscribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.”).
84 PAUL SIMON, 50 Ways to Leave Your Lover, on STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS
(Columbia Records 1975).
85 Id.
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Creditor A a security interest), but doesn’t repay Creditor B, there is of course
a risk that the trustee will successfully challenge the payment as a preference.86
In this case, Creditor A will be forced to disgorge the payment, putting
Creditor A back on the same (unsecured) footing as Creditor B, and vindicating
the equality of creditors norm. Our case would thus look a lot like Clarke.87
It is at least as likely, however, that the trustee will not recover the payment
to Creditor A; that Creditor A will, in effect, slip out the back. This can occur in
several different ways. If Firm holds off on filing for ninety-one days, its payment
to Creditor A will be outside the preference period and thus immune from attack
by the trustee.88 Running out the clock is the cleanest escape for Creditor A, since
it avoids any possibility of a preference action, except in the rare case where
Creditor A might plausibly have been “in control” of Firm, which would extend
the preference period to a full year.89 Even if Firm does file for bankruptcy less
than ninety days after its payment to Creditor A, Creditor A may be able to
defend by arguing that the payment qualifies for one of the preference safe
harbors.90 The second of the safe harbors, which protects payments made in the
ordinary course of business, is particularly promising, insulating many potential
preferences from avoidance.91 Firm may be able to supplement its defense by
invoking one or more of the other eight safe harbors as well.92
The discussion thus far has assumed that Creditor A’s claim arose from an
ordinary loan or extension of credit. If Creditor A extended credit to Firm
through a derivative contract or repurchase agreement, the $50,000 payment—or
Firm’s grant of a security interest to Creditor A—would be entirely outside of
the preference system, regardless how close to bankruptcy Firm made the $50,000
payment. Current bankruptcy law exempts derivatives, repos, and other financial
agreements from the preference provision altogether.93 In the weeks before
Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, J.P. Morgan Chase demanded and received
a $5 billion payment from Lehman, an eve-of-bankruptcy grab that enjoyed
blanket protection from the preference rules.94
From a historical perspective, these gaping holes in the trustee’s ability to
recover preferences are ironic. In 1978, Congress completely revised the
86 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012) (authorizing the trustee to avoid payments and other transfers
made within ninety days of bankruptcy).
87 See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
88 See § 547(b).
89 See id. (establishing a one-year preference period for any “insider”); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(31)(B)(iii) (2012) (defining “insider” to include “person in control” of the debtor-corporation).
90 See § 547(c).
91 See id. at (c)(2).
92 See id. at (c).
93 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)–(g) (2012).
94 See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 67-68 (2010)
(describing J.P. Morgan Chase’s use of its “right of offset” to secure payment from Lehman).
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preference rule in an effort to make it easier for the trustee to retrieve
prebankruptcy transfers.95 Yet in practice, nearly as many eve-of-bankruptcy
transfers may be immune from attack as before.
If Creditor A receives a $50,000 payment prior to bankruptcy, the odds
are quite high that Creditor A will be able to keep it, even if Creditor B stands
to receive far less in bankruptcy. Neither the equality of creditors norm nor
the preference rules that are the norm’s principal instantiation in bankruptcy
are likely to stand in Firm’s and Creditor A’s way.
B. Using the Executory Contract Rules to Favor a Particular Creditor
It might seem that, if Firm does not pay Creditor A before filing for
bankruptcy, equal treatment of Creditor A and Creditor B is much more
likely. But it isn’t. Even in bankruptcy, Firm can easily ensure that Creditor
A gets paid more than Creditor B if it so chooses.
Suppose, for instance, the $50,000 that Firm owes Creditor A is an unpaid
obligation under an ongoing contract between the two parties. Bankruptcy treats
such a contract as “executory,” and authorizes Firm to either assume or reject the
contract.96 If Firm assumes the contract, it is required to cure any defaults and
pay any obligations in full;97 by contrast, if Firm rejects the contract, any unpaid
obligations under the contract give rise to an unsecured claim.98 By assuming
Creditor A’s contract, while rejecting Creditor B’s (if it too has an executory
contract with Firm), Firm can thus arrange favorable treatment for Creditor A.
The recent municipal bankruptcy of Stockton, California illustrates the
deviations from equality of creditors that can be achieved by assuming an executory
contract. Stockton’s restructuring plan proposed to pay some of its bondholders less
than ten cents on the dollar. Stockton’s large amount of unfunded pension liabilities
were unsecured obligations, just like its bonds, and the bankruptcy judge strongly
suggested that Stockton should restructure the obligations.99 This might have
assured a roughly comparable treatment of the two classes of unsecured claims. But
the pension liabilities arose under an employment contract that was executory in
nature. Rather than restructure the pensions, Stockton assumed the contract.100 As
95
96

See infra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012). According to the standard (though often criticized) definition, a
contract is executory if the obligations still owed by both parties under the contract are significant
enough that failure by either to perform would constitute a material breach of the contract. See, e.g.,
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
97 See § 365(b)(1).
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1) (2012).
99 See Mary Williams Walsh, Judge Approves Bankruptcy Exit for Stockton, Calif., N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2014, 3:35 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/judge-approves-bankruptcyexit-for-stockton-calif/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2B8A-55T3].
100 In re City of Stockton, Cal., 526 B.R. 35, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
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a result, the City was able to pay its pension beneficiaries in full, while offering a
radically smaller recovery to the bondholders.101
C. Designating Favored Creditors as “Critical Vendors”
If Firm and Creditor A did not have a contract, or if their contract was no
longer executory by the time Firm filed for bankruptcy, the executory contract
strategy obviously would not be available. Firm’s trade creditors may provide
goods or services on “open account,” for instance, rather than under a longterm
contract. Although Firm might need to be slightly more creative, there still are a
variety of ways to give Creditor A more favorable treatment than Creditor B.102
The easiest strategy is for Firm to say that it desperately needs Creditor A’s
services and fears that Creditor A will stop providing them unless Firm pays the
$50,000 of prebankruptcy obligations in full. In current practice, debtor can pay
the unsecured claims of its “critical vendors” in full.103 Critical vendor treatment
traditionally was viewed as a limited exception to the equality of creditors norm,104
but its use is now commonplace in large cases. Bankruptcy judges rarely require a
debtor to present any meaningful evidence that a supplier truly is irreplaceable
and would cease doing business with the debtor unless it is paid in full.
A few years ago, Judge Easterbrook put a scare into this strategy in the
Kmart bankruptcy.105 Kmart claimed that 2330 of its suppliers—with claims
totaling $300 million—qualified as critical vendors. After pointing out that
the bankruptcy laws do not explicitly authorize special treatment of critical
vendors, Judge Easterbrook concluded that, even if it “allows critical-vendors
orders in principle, preferential payments to a class of creditors are proper
only if the record shows the prospect of benefit to the other creditors. This
record does not, so the critical-vendors orders cannot stand.”106
Although the Kmart decision caused a frenzy of excitement when it
appeared, and perhaps has curbed some of the more extravagant claims about
critical vendor status, debtors continue to make generous use of critical

101
102

Id.
If Creditor A supplied goods within 20 days of bankruptcy, no ingenuity is required. In
2005, Congress added a provision giving priority treatment to these suppliers: 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9)
(2012). This special protection has proven quite costly for Chapter 11 debtors in many cases.
103 See, e.g., Mark A. McDermott, Critical Vendor and Related Orders: Kmart and the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 409, 409 (2006) (“[T]here
are several classes of prepetition creditors whose claims must be paid in the ordinary course, prior to
confirmation of a plan, if the business is to have any realistic chance of successfully reorganizing.”).
104 Critical vendor treatment is an outgrowth and expansion of the “doctrine of necessity,”
which dates back to the railroad receiverships of the late nineteenth century. See Fosdick v. Schall,
99 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1878) (upholding, with “no doubt,” payment in full of key creditors).
105 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
106 Id. at 874.
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vendor doctrine.107 If Firm singled out Creditor A as a critical vendor and
proposed to pay its $50,000 obligation in full, a bankruptcy judge would
probably approve the critical vendor order.
D. Incorporating Favored Treatment into a Sale
The fourth strategy, which is available even if Creditor A cannot plausibly
qualify as a critical vendor, is for Firm to arrange to sell its assets in a 363 sale
to a buyer that is willing to assume Firm’s obligations to Creditor A.
The most dramatic use of the sale strategy came in the Chrysler bailout
in 2009. To rescue and restructure Chrysler, the government arranged for a
sale of nearly all of Chrysler’s assets to a newly created entity commonly
known as New Chrysler.108 In addition to the $2 billion purchase price, New
Chrysler agreed to pay $5.3 billion of prebankruptcy trade claims in full, and
also to give a $4.6 billion promissory note and 55% of New Chrysler’s stock
to Chrysler’s retirees.109 By including these commitments in the sales
agreement, Chrysler and the government ensured that the trade and retiree
claims were paid in full, even though Chrysler’s senior lenders and tort
creditors received almost no payment for their unsecured claims.
Even prior to Chrysler, purchasers often assumed some of a debtor’s
obligations in connection with a section 363 sale. Chrysler simply took the
strategy to levels that no one had previously dared.110
E. Subverting Equality in the Reorganization Plan Itself
Finally, suppose that Firm doesn’t want to sell its assets, and none of the
other three strategies is available to it. The reorganization plan itself provides
several additional opportunities to favor Creditor A over Creditor B.
If Firm can find an accommodating senior creditor, Firm may be able to
arrange a “gifting” transaction as part of its reorganization plan. In a classic
gifting arrangement, a senior creditor agrees to cede part of its recovery to a
lower priority class of claims or interests. A bank that is owed $100,000 and
claims to be fully secured might accept a $90,000 recovery, and donate the
107 See Travis N. Turner, Note, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look at Critical Vendor Orders and the
Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 434-36 (2006) (“Once a rare phenomenon, critical
vendor orders have become increasingly standard operating procedure in large Chapter 11 cases.”).
108 See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87-92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing and
upholding the sale), aff ’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).
109 Id. at 91-92.
110 For an analysis and comparison to the obligations assumed in other bankruptcy sales, see
Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, How the Chrysler Reorganization Differed from Prior Practice, 5 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 399, 401 (2013) (“On multiple key financial characteristics, Chrysler was well
outside the mainstream, in the company of only the most controversial of prior . . . sales.”).
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remaining $10,000 of its recovery to one class of general creditors. Gifting
figured prominently in Detroit’s bankruptcy case. The unlimited tax GO
bondholders, who argued that their bonds were secured revenue bonds, agreed
to a settlement that paid them 76 cents on the dollar, and required them to
“gift” the other 24 cents on the dollar to Detroit’s pension beneficiaries.111
Gifting has gotten somewhat tricky in the Second and Third Circuits,
thanks to a pair of recent decisions invalidating gifting arrangements.112 Both
expressed concern that the ostensible gifts may in reality subvert bankruptcy’s
priority rules and equality of creditors norm. But bankruptcy practitioners
have strongly defended gifting,113 and it remains an option in many cases. The
bankruptcy judge in the Detroit case approved the gifting features in Detroit’s
debt adjustment plan.114 Nor has gifting disappeared altogether even in the
Third Circuit. In the World Health Alternatives case, a Delaware bankruptcy
judge distinguished the troublesome Third Circuit precedent and approved a
reorganization plan that included significant gifting.115
Even if gifting isn’t available, Firm may still be able to use the reorganization
process to favor Creditor A. Firm and its managers have broad discretion on how
to structure the proposed reorganization plan. Although both Creditor A and
Creditor B are unsecured creditors, Firm can put them in separate classes, and can
propose to give Creditor A’s class a bigger payout than Creditor B’s. This was
precisely what Detroit did in its bankruptcy.116 Detroit created a class for its pension
beneficiaries, and gave them roughly 70 cents on the dollar, while offering a class of
tort creditors much less—13 cents.117 It was far from clear whether the differential
treatment was permissible under current bankruptcy law. As discussed earlier, the
“unfair discrimination” requirement has long been thought to require that classes
of unsecured creditors receive roughly comparable treatment.118 But the
111 The Detroit gifting is discussed more fully in David A Skeel, Jr., From Chrysler and General
Motors to Detroit, 24 WIDENER L.J. 121, 145-46 (2015).
112 See In re DBSD, 634 F.3d 79, 97 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[Gifting] does not square with the text of
the Bankruptcy Code.”); In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 513 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
plain language of the statute makes it clear that a plan cannot give property to junior claimants over
the objection of a more senior class that is impaired . . . .”).
113 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Ronit J. Berkovich, The Implications of the Third Circuit’s
Armstrong Decision on Creative Corporate Restructuring: Will Strict Construction of the Absolute Priority
Rule Make Chapter 11 Consensus Less Likely?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2006) (characterizing
gifting as “creative structuring to achieve substantial consensus as to the distribution of value”).
114 See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 171, 189 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
115 See In re World Health Alts., Inc., 344 B.R. 291, 297 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
116 524 B.R. at 255-59. In the consumer bankruptcy context, courts have sometimes allowed debtors to
provide a much higher payout for a class of nondischargeable obligations such as student loans than for other
unsecured creditors. For discussion and critique of the cases, see Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt,
Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 635 (2014).
117 524 B.R. at 253.
118 See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy judge in the Detroit case concluded that the test for whether
discrimination is acceptable is the bankruptcy judge’s conscience,119 thus suggesting
that the judge is under no obligation to honor the equality of creditors norm.
*

*

*

Together, these developments enable the debtor to favor a particular
creditor or group of general creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy and at
nearly any point in the bankruptcy case.120 Absent major adjustments to
current bankruptcy doctrine, the equality of creditors norm seems to be on
the verge of disappearing altogether.
What, if anything, should be done? The three most plausible answers to
this question are to do nothing, to reinvigorate the equality of creditors norm,
or to abandon it. Having shown what doing nothing looks like in this Part, I
consider the other alternatives in the next two.
III. REINVIGORATING THE EQUALITY OF CREDITORS NORM
The equality of creditors norm has long been central to American bankruptcy
law, as we have seen. We should therefore begin by considering what a more robust
pursuit of equality would look like, and whether this might be an improvement on
existing law. As this Part illustrates, a few simple reforms could restore much of
the vanishing equality if this were a desirable objective. Whether reinvigorating
equality really is the right objective will turn out to be a very different question.
A. What Might Reform Look Like?
1. Preferences
We start with preference law, the doctrine most closely associated with the
equality of creditors norm. Much of the leakage in current preference law can be
traced to the expansiveness of the safe harbor for payments made in the ordinary
course of business.121 Once limited to payments made within forty-five days of the

119
120

524 B.R. at 256.
Yet another strategy that may protect a favored creditor is a roll-up of a prebankruptcy loan. By
subsuming an old loan into a new loan that adds to the prebankruptcy collateral, a debtor assures fully
secured status, and thus full payment, for a loan that might otherwise have been partially unsecured. See,
e.g., Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 70709 (2009) (“Postpetition lenders seek to condition the debtor’s access to credit on [, inter alia,] roll-ups . . . .”).
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2012). In 2005, Congress amended § 547(c)(2) to make the requirement
disjunctive. Prior to 2005, the creditor was required to show that the transfer was in the ordinary course both
from the perspective of the industry and in terms of the two parties dealings with one another. See Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 409, 119 Stat. 23, 106.
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extension of credit, it now has unlimited scope.122 In addition to the absence of any
temporal limitation, a creditor need only show that the payment it received was in
the ordinary course of either the industry or the two parties.123 The simplest way
to restore the equality of creditors norm in the preference context would be to
sharply restrict the ordinary course safe harbor, or perhaps excise it altogether. If
Creditor A could not invoke this safe harbor, it would be considerably more difficult
for Firm to favor Creditor A by repaying it on the eve of bankruptcy.
The other glaring intrusion on equality of creditors is the special
treatment of derivatives and other financial contracts.124 If Firm and Creditor
A have structured their transaction as a derivative, payments to Creditor A
are entirely exempt from the preference rules. Reversing this special
treatment would further reinvigorate the equality of creditors norm.
These two adjustments would restore much of the lost equality in the
preference context. Bankruptcy courts could play a small role in restoring
creditor equality by construing each of the intrusions narrowly.125 But the
preference inequality has a statutory basis. A more complete restoration of
creditor equality would therefore require amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
2. Executory Contracts
As with preferences, Firm’s ability to favor Creditor A by assuming the
parties’ executory contract comes from the bankruptcy statute itself, and
therefore would require a statutory fix. But the fix is remarkably simple: all
Congress would need to do is amend the executory contract provision to require
that any unpaid prebankruptcy obligations be treated as unsecured obligations in
all cases—regardless of whether Firm assumes the executory contract.126 If Firm
assumed Creditor A’s contract, Firm would commit to fulfill any future
obligations under the contract, but the $50,000 of prebankruptcy obligations
would be treated as a general unsecured claim, just as with Creditor B. This
simple fix would not put Creditor A and Creditor B in precisely the same place.
Their postpetition status would be different, since Firm’s postpetition obligations
122 Under the 1978 Code as first enacted, transfers made in the ordinary course of business were only
protected if the transfer occurred within forty-five days of the time the creditor extended credit. The fortyfive day restriction was removed in 1984. The Supreme Court discusses these developments in its most
important preference case under the 1978 Code, Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 156-59 (1991).
123 See supra note 121.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.
125 A few courts have gestured in this direction. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Gas Distribs., 346 B.R.
394, 402-03 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
126 Lawmakers could achieve the change through a simple amendment of 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)
making clear that the debtor’s obligation to cure any defaults and to provide adequate assurance of
future performance does not apply to compensating the nondebtor for prebankruptcy obligations.
These would be treated as general claims, just as they are under current law when the debtor rejects
a contract. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1) (2012).
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to Creditor A would be treated as administrative expenses and given priority
status.127 But it would eliminate much of the disparity in their treatment.128
3. The Other Departures from Equality
Each of the other intrusions on creditor equality could be remedied without
formally amending the bankruptcy laws. Courts gaveth critical vendor doctrine,
and courts could taketh it away.129 Judge Easterbrook’s Kmart decision laid the
groundwork for just such a retrenchment.130 The debtor would not be required
to cease dealing with its key suppliers, and it could pay them in full for
postpetition deliveries, but the court would require unpaid prebankruptcy
obligations be given the same treatment as other general unsecured claims.
Protecting the equality of creditors principle in the context of a sale would
be slightly more complicated, given the presence of a third party that
theoretically is making an independent judgement whether to repay some of the
debtor’s prebankruptcy obligations. If a third party that purchases Firm’s assets
also decides to repay Creditor A entirely outside the bankruptcy process, this is
arguably not a concern of bankruptcy.131 Creditor equality requires only that
Creditor A and Creditor B receive comparable treatment in bankruptcy. The
problem comes when the asset purchase and payment of Creditor A appear to
be connected, and are in effect an ad hoc reorganization plan.132 This concern is
especially acute if the cost of paying Creditor A’s claim is treated as part of
buyer’s purchase price. But the special treatment of a favored creditor may be
an implicit part of the bid, even if it is not included in the formal purchase price.
Two adjustments might strengthen creditor equality. The first is to consider
only the cash (or credit bid) portion of a buyer’s bid in determining the amount
of the bid.133 If Firm receives two bids for its assets, the higher cash bid would
127
128

See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Strictly speaking, this adjustment would not be based on the original equality of creditors norm.
Under the historical norm, creditors whose claims arose because their executory contracts were not
assumed would be general creditors, but creditors whose contracts were assumed would not. For more
on the historical evolution of bankruptcy’s treatment of executory contracts, see, e.g., Michael T. Andrew,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 849-50 (1988). For
a critique of the contemporary relevance of this history, see Westbrook, supra note 82, at 325.
129 One qualification: to fully assure equality of creditors, Congress would need to undo the
special treatment of sellers of goods by removing § 503(b)(9).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
131 For a defense of the GM and Chrysler cases on these grounds, see Stephen Lubben, No Big
Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 538 (2009).
132 In the Chrysler case, the sale agreement arranged by the U.S. government explicitly required New
Chrysler, the purchaser, to pay Chrysler’s trade claims and retiree benefits. See Motion of Debtors & Debtors
in Possession, Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 and 365 of the Bankr. Code and Bankr. Rules 2002, 6004 & 6006
at 25-31, In re Chrysler, LLC, No. 09-5002, 2009 WL 1227661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2009).
133 For a proposal along these lines, see generally Richard Squire, Debt Bidding (May 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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prevail, even if an alternative bid might be higher if debt assumption were
treated as part of the bid. The second is to ensure a robust market check by
minimizing the obstacles to making a bid.134 Neither would directly assure
equal treatment, but both would reduce the likelihood of deviations.
The final intrusion on creditor equality—differential treatment of different
classes of unsecured creditors—can also be prevented without amending the
Bankruptcy Code. Courts could simply interpret the “unfair discrimination”
requirement stringently, casting a skeptical eye on classification schemes that
call for divergent treatment of otherwise similar classes of creditors.135
B. The Implications of Greater (or Lesser) Equality
The discussion to this point has shown that if courts and Congress were
motivated to do so, they could easily reinvigorate the equality of creditors norm.
Debtors and other parties probably would still manage to evade the equality norm
on occasion, but the changes described in the last section would ensure much more
robust adherence to the norm. Is this the way forward? Is greater creditor equality
preferable to the landscape that characterizes current bankruptcy practice?
I’m not so sure.
The first thing to note is that there’s nothing inherently problematic about
giving one creditor more favorable treatment than another in bankruptcy if the
special treatment is fully disclosed in advance. As long as creditors know where
they stand and can adjust the terms of the credit they extend, a disfavored creditor
will simply take its expected bankruptcy treatment into account when it makes its
initial loan to the debtor.136 From an ex ante perspective, the disfavored creditor is
no worse off than the favored creditor. In some contexts, it may be more
problematic not to provide differential treatment.137 Nor are deviations from equal
treatment ethically charged, as they are in other contexts. The deviations are not
used to discriminate on the basis of race or gender, for instance. To the contrary,
they sometimes favor more vulnerable creditors, such as pension beneficiaries. We
cannot simply assume that failures to honor creditor equality are pernicious.
134 Courts could significantly limit any termination fees or qualified bid requirements, and
could require that the auction be kept open long enough for potential bidders to emerge. See, e.g.,
Roe & Skeel, supra note 5, at 766.
135 For an argument that this is required under current law, see Richard M. Hynes & Steven
D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 25, 69 (2015);
see also Markell, supra note 79, at 228.
136 For the classic analysis of creditors who cannot realistically adjust, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1996),
which notes “the ability to use security interests to divert value from nonadjusting creditors tends to distort
the borrower’s choice of contractual arrangements with its creditors, giving rise to certain efficiency costs.”
137 See Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.,
concurring) (“Equality among creditors who have lawfully bargained for different treatment is not
equity but its opposite . . . .”).
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Second, while some of the equality-enhancing strategies might improve
current bankruptcy law, others would not. As discussed in the next Part,
tighter restrictions on sales might be beneficial. The implications of the other
reforms are more mixed, however, and with preference law—the doctrine
with which creditor equality is most closely associated and from which it
emerged—a shift to true creditor equality would make bankruptcy law worse,
not better. In bankruptcy, equality is not everything it’s imagined to be.
IV. RETHINKING THE EQUALITY OF CREDITORS NORM
The absence of an obvious benefit from increasing equality, and the
normatively mixed results of moving in this direction, suggest that we cannot
simply assume that the equality norm is desirable. As we consider the
equality-enhancing strategies more closely, we will find that it is not.
A. Equality’s Original Home: The Preference Provision
Start with the prohibition on preferences, the context where the equality
norm first arose. As noted in the last Part, the best way to realign preference
law with the equality of creditors norm would be simply to remove the
ordinary course safe harbor.138 Other safe harbors can be reconciled with
equality of creditors; ordinary course, much less so. If a company falls into
financial distress after previously having paid all of its creditors in a timely
fashion, and decides to stop paying all but one of its creditors, the favored
creditor’s treatment clearly violates the equality of creditor norm, but the
creditor is likely to come squarely within the ordinary course safe harbor.139
In addition to moving preference law much closer to the equality of
creditors norm, removing the ordinary course safe harbor would reduce the
litigation costs of preference avoidance actions. Creditors that have received
prebankruptcy transfers regularly invoke the ordinary course safe harbor in
their defense.140 The defense often succeeds, and the need to show that a
payment was not given in the ordinary course imposes significant costs even
when the trustee eventually prevails.141 The sharp reduction in the cost of
avoiding preferential transfers would be a major benefit of promoting equality
of creditors by removing the ordinary course safe harbor.
138
139
140

See supra subsection III.A.1.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2012).
See, e.g., Bryan Kotliar, Note, A New Reading of the Ordinary Course of Business Exception in
Section 547(c)(2), 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 211, 215 (2013) (concluding that the ordinary course
of business safe harbor is overly broad and needs to be narrowed).
141 See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, The Problem with Preferences, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 11, 12-13
(2014) (noting the cost of preference litigation and proposing that the dollar amount in the de
minimis exception to the preference provision in § 547(c)(9) be significantly increased).
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Removing the most frequently invoked safe harbor is not the only way to
reduce the costs of preference litigation, however. The same benefit could be
achieved in precisely the opposite way, by curtailing the preference provision
or even deleting it altogether. Is an expanded preference provision superior
to no provision at all?
In the nineteenth century, the answer to this question might well have
been yes. In the absence of preference law, out-of-state creditors faced a
significant risk that the debtor would favor some creditors—often family
members, relatives, or other local creditors—over others if it fell into financial
distress.142 By the time the disfavored creditor realized that a once-viable
business was in swift decline, it might have been too late. This, at least, was
the risk that creditors and their advocates repeatedly pointed to when they
argued for a robust preference law.143 This suggests that preference law might
have diminished creditors’ need to take costly precautions.
Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a series
of developments significantly reduced a potentially disfavored creditor’s risk,
and thus the need for the preference law. The first was that improvements in
information technology made it less likely that creditors would be taken by
surprise by a debtor’s financial distress. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, the leading credit reporting agency incorporated formal financial
statements into its data collection process144 and began using typewriters and
carbon paper to replicate its reports, “thus permitting a rapid and
simultaneous distribution of credit information throughout the firm.”145
These innovations dramatically expanded its scope and effectiveness. In 1870,
the agency had 7000 subscribers; by 1900, it had over a million.146
Second, and most important, the distinction between local and out-of-state
creditors diminished in significance. Bankruptcy itself contributed to this
shift. Because bankruptcy courts had nationwide jurisdiction, a financially
distressed debtor could no longer pay local creditors and then flee.147 Gone

142 See also supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth century debates
over preferences).
143 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
144 See James H. Madison, The Evolution of Commercial Credit Reporting Agencies in
Nineteenth-Century America, 48 BUS. HIST. REV. 164, 172 (1974).
145 See JAMES D. NORRIS, R.G. DUN & CO. 1841–1900, at 138 (1978); see also Madison, supra
note 144, at 176.
146 See Rowena Olegario, Credit-Reporting Agencies: A Historical Perspective, in CREDIT
REPORTING SYSTEMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 115, 122-23 (Margaret J. Miller ed.,
2003).
147 Debtors may have been less likely to obtain financing from family and friends, though these
sources of financing remained relevant for many small businesses.
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were the days when local courthouse clerks stamped G.T.T.—“Gone to
Texas”—on pleadings filed by creditors whose debtors had left the state.148
Finally, the expansion and systemization of the law of secured credit made
it easier to create and perfect a security interest. In the nineteenth century, a
creditor often could not take a security interest unless it took possession of
the collateral, and some kinds of assets such as accounts receivable were
difficult to secure.149 Requiring a debtor to provide collateral thus became a
genuine option for a broader range of creditors who might otherwise have
been vulnerable in the event of financial distress.
I do not mean to suggest that financially distressed debtors no longer pay
favored creditors, thus leaving fewer assets available for disfavored creditors. The
laws of human nature have not been repealed. Business owners sometimes are
tempted to repay loans from family members, or repay themselves, shortly before
their business fails. But this problem could be addressed by a targeted rule
prohibiting self-dealing, much as the duty of loyalty does in corporate law,150 rather
than a broad preference provision that purports to promote equality of creditors.151
If preference law served another function, in addition to policing
self-dealing, a broader prohibition on preferences might be justified. The
traditional explanation for preference law does indeed have a second theme:
preserving the value of a troubled debtor’s assets by discouraging a race to the
courthouse.152 Because payments made to, or liens obtained by, a creditor shortly
before bankruptcy can be retrieved by the trustee, the reasoning goes, creditors
will be less likely to grab assets, thus making it more likely that the parties can
reach a collective, value-preserving solution to the debtor’s financial distress.

148 See, e.g., BALLEISEN, supra note 26, at 170 (describing the G.T.T. phenomenon, as well as
the “Shirkshire Road” label given to debtors who fled from Massachusetts to upstate New York by
way of the Berkshire Mountains).
149 For an overview of the history of secured credit, see generally 1 GRANT GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965).
150 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2017). Retaining the trustee’s power to avoid security
interests and other liens acquired on the eve of bankruptcy also would make sense, since these liens
do not serve any beneficial function.
151 A self-dealing oriented provision could simply permit the trustee to avoid payments made to
insiders on the eve of bankruptcy, relying on the existing (or perhaps an expanded) bankruptcy
definition of insider. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
which has been adopted by many states and is available to the trustee in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(b) (2012), already includes such a provision. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(b), 7A
U.L.A. 129 (2006) (“A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before
the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was
insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.”).
152 See, e.g., Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business Bankruptcy: The Need for
Different Rules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 64 (2014) (describing the “race to the
courthouse” or “grab race” concern and differing views as to whether this is a more or less important
objective of preference law than the equality of creditors objective).
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The first thing to note about the “grab race” justification for preference law
is that it has very little to do with the equality norm.153 The argument contends
that the preference prohibition discourages creditors from destroying the going
concern value of a debtor’s assets in their rush to collect what they are owed.
According to this rationale, the virtue of preference law is that it maximizes the
value of the debtor’s assets. Equality, which is concerned with how the assets
are distributed, is at most an accidental byproduct.
If the “grab race” rationale for preference law were compelling, the equality
norm would be irrelevant (rather than counterproductive) in this context. But
the “grab race” rationale is deeply flawed. With the earliest bankruptcy laws,
the preference prohibition did play at least a limited role in discouraging a race
to the courthouse. The early laws did not explicitly impose an automatic stay
on creditor collection efforts at the time a bankruptcy petition was filed.154 A
creditor theoretically could ignore the bankruptcy proceeding, and continue to
try to collect what it was owed. In Ex parte Foster, Justice Story, sitting as a
circuit court judge, ruled that the preference provision in the 1841 Act voided
the prejudgment attachment obtained by a creditor that continued to pursue
its state law action after the bankruptcy filing.155 In this context, preference
law served as a substitute for a stay on enforcement.
Preference law is highly unlikely to discourage grabs more generally, however.
Because the worst that can happen to a creditor who receives a potentially
preferential payment is being asked to give it back, creditors have very little
incentive to refrain from collecting.156 A creditor who pursues a prebankruptcy
payment will not be able to recover its litigation and other collection expenses if
the payment is later avoided as a preference.157 But this is the only significant cost.
And if the debtor does not file for bankruptcy for more than ninety days or the
creditor can invoke a safe harbor, the creditor will be able to keep the full payment,
rather than waiting for its pro rata share of a subsequent bankruptcy distribution.158
153
154

See id.
Congress did not implement an explicit automatic stay for the first time until 1933. See
Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 177, 179-80 (1978).
155 9 Fed. Cas. 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1842) (No. 4954).
156 See also John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA.
L. REV. 249, 264 (1981) (noting that creditors have “much to gain and little to lose” by engaging in a
potentially preferential transaction since “there is a good chance that one who receives a preference will
be able to keep it”—“[b]ankruptcy may never be filed,” or at least not “within ninety days of the transfer,”
or “the trustee may find it inexpedient to initiate recapture proceedings”). The futility of preference law
may explain why Justice Stevens seems to have gotten confused about the logic in his opinion in a key
preference case. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (suggesting that an exception from,
rather than application of, the preference provision “may benefit all creditors by deterring the ‘race to the
courthouse’ and enabling the struggling debtor to continue operating its business”).
157 See McCoid, supra note 156, at 265.
158 For an argument that the incentive to collect well before bankruptcy actually is a benefit of
existing law, since it rewards early monitoring, see George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role
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To be sure, it would not be hard to give the preference provision real
teeth. Lawmakers need only include a stiff penalty on top of the requirement
that a favored creditor disgorge the preference.159 But this option has never
been seriously considered—probably because creditors have a legal and moral
entitlement to be repaid, and in that sense are not doing anything wrong
when they attempt to collect on the eve of bankruptcy.160
If preference avoidance should be limited to self-dealing transactions, as
I have argued, the equality norm appears to have played a pernicious role in
the twentieth century evolution of preference law. The early preference
provisions functioned very much like a ban on self-dealing. Under the
original version of the 1898 provision, the trustee could avoid preferential
transfers that occurred less than four months before bankruptcy, but only if
the trustee could show that the beneficiary “had reasonable cause to believe
that it was intended thereby to give a preference.”161 This requirement was
amended in 1938 to require only that the trustee show that the beneficiary
had “reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.”162 Even under
the more relaxed standard that emerged, the trustee would fare better in
preference actions against insiders than with outside creditors, because it was
much easier for the trustee to show insiders knew the debtor was insolvent.
In the debates that led to the 1978 Code, these earlier provisions were
condemned as failing to live up to the equal treatment objective. A House
subcommittee report was particularly pointed in its condemnation. A “creditor’s
state of mind has nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of equality of
distribution,” the report’s drafters wrote, “and whether or not he knows of the
debtor’s insolvency does little to comfort other creditors similarly situated who
will receive that much less from the debtor’s estate as a result of the
prebankruptcy transfer to the preferred creditor.”163 Whatever arguments might
be marshalled in support of the existing provision were trumped, the drafters
believed, by these equality concerns. “To argue that the creditor’s state of mind
is an important element of a preference and that creditors should not be required
to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence,” they insisted, “is to ignore
the strong bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors.”164 Other proponents

of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1094-95 (1995). In my view, any
additional monitoring benefits are not sufficient to justify the costs of the current preference rules.
159 See McCoid, supra note 156, at 269-70.
160 See also id. (arguing that sanctions for preferential transfers would punish innocent and
guilty creditors alike).
161 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978).
162 Act of June 27, 1938, ch. 6, § 60(b), Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (repealed 1978).
163 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 178 (1977).
164 Id.
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of a broader preference provision made similar arguments.165 As a result,
Congress adopted the current presumption that every eve-of-bankruptcy
transfer to an unsecured creditor should be avoidable as a preference.166
Notice the perverse effect of the equality norm in this context. Equality of
creditors was the inspiration for the current, deeply flawed preference
provision. If the equality of creditors principle were not so entrenched in
bankruptcy mythology, the preference provision might be limited to its proper
domain—policing self-dealing. But the equality of creditors norm continues
to prop up a doctrine long after its significance has withered away.167
B. Moving Beyond Equality: Sales and Other Issues
Although preference law was the original home of the equality of creditors
norm, the prohibition on preferences had a shifting and idiosyncratic history in
America. Perhaps, one might think, the “equality is equity” principle plays a
more central and necessary role in the other doctrinal contexts where it is
proclaimed. In this Section, I more briefly revisit each of these other contexts
we have considered. In none of them is the equality norm necessary, or even
helpful.
1. Tweaking the Treatment of Executory Contracts
After preferences, executory contracts are the context where the equality
norm seems most likely to play an essential role. Commentators frequently
point to equality of creditors as the principle on which the current rule is
based.168 If the debtor rejects an executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code
characterizes the nondebtor’s damages claim as a general unsecured
obligation, thus giving it the same status as unsecured claims that arose prior

165 See, e.g., The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the S. Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 101 (1975) (statement of
the Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges).
166 A contemporaneous article by a leading drafter of the 1978 Code suggests that the equality
norm figured prominently in the decision to broaden the preference provision. See Richard B. Levin,
An Introduction to the Trustee’s Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 183-84 (1979).
167 An interesting recent article by Brook Gotberg proposes to reinvigorate the equality of
creditors feature of preference law in Chapter 7 liquidations, while eliminating preference law in
Chapter 11 reorganization cases. See generally Gotberg, supra note 152. This would remove some of
the counterproductive features of current preference law and would restore the preference rule to
something like its original domain. But equality is not the real objective even in that context, as the
plethora of priorities in Chapter 7 make clear. It would make more sense to have a more limited, self
dealing–oriented preference rule that applied in all contexts.
168 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 82, at 252.
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to the bankruptcy filing.169 This treatment is often described as
promoting—and dictated by—the equality of creditors objective.170
The problem identified earlier—debtors thwarting the equality norm by
assuming the contract of a favored creditor—complicates but does not by
itself undermine the conventional understanding of executory contracts.
Although bankruptcy’s treatment of rejection accords with equality of
creditors, the reasoning might go, its handling of assumption does not. By
treating the prepetition obligations of a contract that the debtor assumes as
unsecured rather than priority claims,171 lawmakers could curb debtors’ use of
assumption to give better treatment to favored creditors, and more fully align
the executory contract provision with the equality of creditors norm.172
Yet even here, equality of creditors is a loose and potentially misleading
description of the concern. Promising a higher payout to pension beneficiaries
than to bondholders, as several municipal debtors have done, is not inherently
problematic. Their claims are somewhat different, and one can easily imagine
rationales for favoring the pension beneficiaries.173 The real problem was that
the debtor’s ability to assume its contract to the pensioners functioned as a
hidden priority—a “secret lien”—confounding the bondholders’ expectations.174
Three decades ago, Alan Schwartz pointed out that secret liens are not always
as serious a problem as critics assume.175 If a creditor can determine through
ordinary diligence whether other creditors with superior priority exist, he argued,
the fact that the superior creditor has not filed notice of its interest is not
problematic.176 The secret lien problem with executory contracts is much more
intractable than the secret liens Schwartz has in mind. Under Schwartz’s proposed
scheme, first-in-time creditors would take priority over subsequent creditors, even
if the earlier creditor were unsecured and had not filed a public financing
statement.177 Schwartz envisioned that subsequent creditors could discover any
existing creditors by reviewing the debtor’s audited financial statements or tax
169
170

See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2012).
See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 128, at 924 (“[T]he entire purpose of rejection is to preclude
. . . discriminatory elevation of the nondebtor party to priority over other creditors.”).
171 Recall that the debtor is required to cure any defaults and provide assurance of performance
when it assumes a contract. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2012). These obligations are treated as
administrative expenses that must be paid in full. Id.
172 As noted earlier, this adjustment would depart from the historical contours of equality of
creditors in this context. See supra notes 126–28.
173 This is especially true in the municipal bankruptcy context, since cuts in pension
beneficiaries’ entitlements could lead to greater social costs in the future if the lower pension benefits
are not sufficient to live on.
174 For discussion of secret lien problems, see generally Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the
Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LEGAL. STUD. 53 (1983), and supra note 14.
175 See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 209, 219-22 (1989).
176 Id. at 220.
177 Id. at 219.
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records.178 With executory contracts, by contrast, it is impossible to know whether
a particular creditor will be favored, because the creditor’s status is not determined
ex ante. The debtor makes its assumption or rejection decision after it files for
bankruptcy. This is a far more pernicious secret lien issue.
A true secret lien imposes several potentially serious costs. The most
obvious is the cost of uncertainty. A creditor that does not know what its
status will be in the event of bankruptcy will need to assume that its recovery
may be subordinated to that of other creditors.179 Creditors may also take
costly measures that will make them seem more essential to the debtor, and
thus more likely to receive favored treatment in bankruptcy. In each instance,
creditors may adjust the terms of the credit they extend, passing the costs on
to debtors and increasing the debtor’s cost of credit.180
The relationship between equality and these concerns is accidental at best.
Changing the treatment of the prepetition obligations of an executory contract
is one possible solution, but one could also solve the problem by giving explicit
priority status to particular claims (such as pensions) that are thought to
warrant special protection, as Congress has done with a variety of obligations.181
This solution would not accord with the equality of creditors norm, but it would
address the real underlying problem—the distorting effect of secret liens.
With another executory contract issue, the equality norm is even more
problematic. Several commentators have pointed out that treating the
nondebtor’s damages claim as an unsecured obligation when the debtor rejects an
executory contract can give the debtor too great an incentive to reject.182 The
estate only bears a portion of the cost of rejection, since it invariably will pay
unsecured creditors less than the full amount of their claims. The more deeply
insolvent the debtor is, the greater its incentive to reject will be, even if rejection
imposes substantial costs on the nondebtor. George Triantis proposed that the
damages claim be treated as an administrative expense when the debtor rejects a
contract, to assure that the debtor fully internalized the cost of rejection.183 Jesse

178
179

Id. at 220-21.
For a similar argument, see Roe & Tung, supra note 8, at 1273. Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman have argued that removing the somewhat analogous uncertainty faced by creditors of a
business was one of the key benefits provided by the creation of the corporate form. See generally Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 402 (2000).
180 Secret liens also introduce potential distortions with respect to “nonadjusting” creditors.
See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 136, at 882.
181 Pensions are one of the obligations that are given special priority, but only to a limited
extent. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (2012) (limiting priority for contributions to employee benefit plan
arising from services rendered within 180 days of bankruptcy).
182 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46
DUKE L.J. 517, 532 (1996); George G. Triantis, The Effects of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract
Performance and Adjustment, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 679, 710 (1993).
183 See Triantis, supra note 182, at 697.

732

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 166: 699

Fried offered a series of other possible correctives, including adjustments to the
contract purchase price and a variation on the administrative expense proposal.184
Both Triantis and Fried noted that equality of creditors is considered to be a
central principle in the treatment of executory contracts.185 But both left it behind
as they analyzed the distortions created by the current rule and potential responses
to the distortion.186 They were right to set equality of creditors to the side. Clinging
to the equality norm would further entrench the distortion—and in fact, may well
have already done this under current law.187 The real problem is that the current
rule has a socially inefficient spillover effect. The benefits to the debtor of rejecting
a contract may be less than the costs to the nondebtor of the rejection, but the
current rule does not give the debtor an incentive to take the costs into account.188
With executory contracts, an issue where the equality norm has seemed
most important, it is anything but. The equality norm provides a distorted
picture of the purpose of the provision, and it distracts attention from the
real issues raised by the current rule.
2. Clarifying Critical Vendor Doctrine
As with executory contracts, the central concern with critical vendor doctrine
is that it functions as a hidden priority or secret lien. Nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code identifies some creditors as deserving critical vendor treatment; the decision
of which creditors to designate as critical is made by the debtor after filing for
bankruptcy. The lien is not entirely hidden. In many large cases, other creditors
could make an educated guess as to some of the critical vendors. In a carmaker
bankruptcy, suppliers of parts are obvious candidates, given that many have
184
185
186

See Fried, supra note 182, at 550-66.
See, e.g., id. at 522; Triantis, supra note 182, at 691.
Yeon-Koo Che and Alan Schwartz have offered still another approach that does not rely on the
equality of creditors principle. Focusing on the possibility that the debtor may have an incentive to assume
a socially inefficient contract, Che and Schwartz question the invalidation of ipso facto clauses and the
mandatory nature of § 365. See Yeon-Koo Che & Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules
and Inefficient Continuance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441, 444 (1999). In his classic functional account of
executory contracts, by contrast, Jay Westbrook treated the equality principle as creating a strong
presumption against any deviation from the existing rule that the nondebtor receives only an unsecured
claim if the debtor rejects a contract. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 82, at 256 (concluding that permitting
a nondebtor to receive specific performance “would seriously violate the equality principle”).
187 Courts have occasionally denied debtors’ requests to reject contracts where rejection appears to be
socially problematic, but these cases are uncommon. For discussion, see Fried, supra note 182, at 540-44.
188 In my own view, the simplest solution to the distortions discussed in this Section might be
to treat the prepetition obligations of an assumed contract as an unsecured claim (thus addressing
the secret lien problem) and to make greater use of the “balancing test” used by some courts to
determine whether the debtor should be permitted to reject a contract (thus counteracting the
spillover problem). The principal downside is that the debtor could avoid the risk of being forced to
assume a contract by breaching prior to bankruptcy. See id. at 544. The most important point for
present purposes is that the equality norm adds nothing to the analysis.
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developed in tandem with the carmaker.189 But others will not be so easy to
predict: some debtors define critical vendor very broadly, others more narrowly.190
It is possible that critical vendor doctrine is justifiable, at least with some
vendors, despite the secret lien problem. If some vendors truly would refuse
service if they were not paid in full, and if these vendors cannot realistically be
replaced, courts perhaps should permit payments to critical vendors.191 If the
threats to cut off service are not credible, by contrast, courts should not permit the
payments.192 Either way, the equality norm is once again irrelevant to the analysis.
Here and elsewhere, it is tempting to try to resuscitate the equality norm by
saying that lawmakers and courts should promote equality of creditors unless the
benefits of equality are outweighed by another important bankruptcy objective,
and by narrowly defining equality’s scope. With critical vendor doctrine, if we
conclude that a vendor’s threat is credible, we could justify this in equality terms
by arguing that the threat is unrelated to the vendor’s prepetition claim—it is a
precondition for future service—and thus does not implicate equality of
creditors.193 Allowing the payment under these circumstances would maximize
the value of the debtor’s assets. But if we conclude that the threat is not credible,
the reasoning might go, we would revert to the equality of creditors baseline. The
problem with this reasoning is that equality of creditors is not doing any work. It
is unnecessary to the analysis, which turns entirely on the question whether
allowing critical vendor status will maximize the value of the debtor’s estate.
3. Policing Unusual 363 Sales
A sale by the debtor of most or all of its assets also can create a secret lien (or
hidden priority) in much the same fashion as with critical vendor doctrine.
Suppose the debtor proposes to sell nearly all of its assets to a buyer for $2 billion,
and the buyer signals its intention to pay two classes of junior creditors in full, as
189 For analysis of supply chain links among other manufacturers, see generally Lisa Bernstein,
Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015).
190 See also McDermott, supra note 103, at 415-16 (reviewing the different standards courts use
when analyzing critical vendor classification).
191 Because the cost of the goods supplied to the debtor prior to bankruptcy is a sunk cost, a rational
vendor should not take it into account in deciding whether to continue providing goods after the debtor
files for bankruptcy. See generally JOHN SUTTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE 7-12 (1991)
(explaining the basic economic theory of sunk costs). But many people do take already incurred costs
into account—a phenomenon known as the “sunk cost fallacy.” For a sample of the large behavioral
economics literature exploring the sunk cost fallacy, see, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The
Psychology of Sunk Costs, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 124 (1985).
192 In his Kmart decision, Judge Easterbrook suggested that courts should attempt to
distinguish between these two possibilities. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2004)
(suggesting that it be “necessary to show . . . that the supposedly critical vendors would have ceased
deliveries if old debts were left unpaid”).
193 Thanks to Douglas Baird for identifying this issue and pressing me to clarify the discussion.
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in the Chrysler bankruptcy. If a class of senior creditors will receive the $2 billion
as payment on its $6.9 billion of debt, but will not receive anything else, the
seniors may object that they have been displaced by a secret lien. Classes of junior
creditors whom the buyer does not offer to pay may raise similar objections.
Based on these facts alone, we cannot immediately determine whether the
disfavored creditors’ objections are legitimate. The introduction of an additional
party—the buyer—adds a new complexity. So long as the buyer purchases the
assets legitimately, nothing precludes it from paying some of the debts owed to
former creditors. In the Chrysler example, if the assets were worth $2 billion or
less, the senior creditors got what they were entitled to.194 If the assets were worth
more than $2 billion, by contrast, the disfavored creditors had a real grievance. A
portion of the purchase price may actually have consisted of value the seniors
should have received, but which went to the favored creditors instead.
The strategies described earlier would help distinguish between these two
possibilities. Courts could limit the use of buyer protections that discourage
other potential bids, and they could consider only the amount of a buyer’s
cash bid (or credit bid) when selecting a winning bid.195 Once again, the
equality of creditors principle does not add anything to this analysis. The
principal concern is disguised priorities and the inefficiencies they can cause.
4. Unfair Discrimination
The final set of strategies for favoring one group of creditors over
others—gifting transactions and disproportionate payouts under a plan—is
in some respects the most subtle. The other strategies often pay a favored
creditor in full, while leaving other creditors with little or nothing. Gifting
and discriminatory payouts rarely distinguish so sharply. They usually give
favored creditors somewhat more and disfavored creditors somewhat less.
Pension creditors received at least 60-70% of their claims in the Detroit
bankruptcy, for example, whereas other creditors were given far less.196
Notice that classification—the debtor’s or plan proponent’s authority to
place creditors with equal priority in different classes197—is itself in a sense a
rejection of the equality of creditors principle. If equality of creditors were
the principal objective, all unsecured claims would be put in the same class,
194 The bankruptcy judge heavily emphasized this point in the Chrysler decision. See In re
Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff ’d, 576 F.3d 10 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. Ind.
State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).
195 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. They also could refuse to approve sales that
really are disguised reorganizations. See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 5, at 755-56 (advocating a
presumption that courts invalidate a proposed sale if more than half of the value of the assets would
continue to belong to old shareholders or creditors after the sale).
196 See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
197 See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012).
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as was done under the early American bankruptcy laws. Differential payouts
arise only because the debtor or other proponent of a reorganization plan is
permitted to place general unsecured claims in different classes.
Rather than equality, the real concern once again is the risk of secret liens. A
reorganization plan that offers one class of general creditors considerably more
than another gives a partial priority or partial lien to one group of creditors.
Partial priorities are a familiar feature of the Bankruptcy Code.198 The key
difference is that the partial priorities in the Code are explicit, whereas the
implicit lien created by differential payouts is a secret lien whose contours are not
known when the debtor or other plan proponent proposes a reorganization plan.
The secret lien problem could be addressed in either of two ways. The first is
to interpret the unfair discrimination requirement strictly, and to forbid any
significant deviations in the payouts of two classes of general creditors.199 Under
this approach, a debtor might be permitted to offer a different kind of payment to
different classes of creditors—cash and debt to one, for instance, and stock to
another. But the value of the expected payout would need to be very similar.200
Otherwise, the favored class would benefit from a hidden priority or secret lien.
Under the second approach, courts would look more favorably on differential
payouts, but they would uphold the proposed treatment only if the debtor could
show that the favored class could expect favored treatment outside of bankruptcy.201
The priority is not hidden, according to this logic, because the parties would have
reason to expect that pension claims would receive a higher payout than bonds.202
Neither approach is perfect, but both would counteract the secret lien problem.203
In theory, the equality norm could be used as a supplemental principle,
guiding the inquiry. The stricter approach could be viewed as a rules-based
198 Employees are given a partial priority for prebankruptcy wages, for example, and a related priority
for contributions to an employee benefit plan. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)–(5) (2012) (authorizing priority for up to
$12,850 of wage claims).
199 Richard Hynes and Steven Walt have argued that existing doctrine, properly understood,
imposes significant constraints on differential treatment. See Hynes & Walt, supra note 116, at 616
(arguing that “courts have been applying an unduly narrow construction” and identifying “good
reasons to limit judicial discretion” in regards to the unfair discrimination requirement).
200 A deviation of, say, 10-15% might be acceptable in an appropriate case, for instance, but wider gulfs
would not. See, e.g., David Skeel, Opinion, Fixing Puerto Rico’s Debt Mess, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fixing-puerto-ricos-debt-mess-1452040144
[https://perma.cc/TT2A-S8D8]
(arguing for an explicit cap of 10-15% on deviations in the context of the Puerto Rico bankruptcy).
201 See also Markell, supra note 79, at 262 (including this factor as part of a proposed standard
for addressing unfair discrimination issues).
202 The bankruptcy judge employed a version of this second approach in the Detroit
bankruptcy. Because pensions are protected by Michigan’s state constitution, he concluded, Detroit’s
pensioners had an expectation of preferred treatment in bankruptcy. The Michigan constitutional
provision did not fully protect the pension claims, but it justified a partial priority. In re City of
Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 257 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
203 Strict scrutiny of deviations might make it difficult to confirm a reorganization plan in a complex
case; the partial priority approach would require a judge to make judgments about implicit priorities.
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equality perspective, for instance, and the more flexible approach as allowing
deviations where the creditors are not truly similarly situated. But equality
language is an awkward fit. Equality language is most compelling when it draws
attention to discrimination against a vulnerable and disfavored class, as with
the classic Equal Protection Clause cases. With unfair discrimination, as with
the preference context in which the equality norm first emerged, the creditors
crying out for help are powerful creditors (such as bondholders, in the Detroit
bankruptcy) rather than weak ones. Although equality language certainly can
be used by the comparatively well-off,204 this is not its natural habitat.
Equality language also does not lend itself well to the kinds of comparative
judgments courts make with unfair discrimination, especially in the
bankruptcy context. Equality tends to be either/or: the court determines
whether two creditors are similarly situated, and if they are, it insists that they
be given the same treatment.205 Unfair discrimination is more incremental. It
does not call for absolutely equivalent treatment, just treatment that does not
unduly favor or disfavor a particular class of creditors vis-à-vis other creditors
with the same priority. The terms “fairness” and “unfair discrimination” nicely
capture the relevant concerns. Equality of creditors does not.
C. Equality of Creditors in Consumer Bankruptcy or Liquidation
My focus in this Part has been on the role of the equality norm in Chapter
11 cases. We cannot fully dismiss the equality of creditors norm without
briefly considering its implications for two contexts that more closely fit the
original habitat of the equality norm: consumer bankruptcy and Chapter 7
liquidation. If equality of creditors figured more prominently in either of
these contexts, its function would be far more limited than conventional
wisdom implies, but still vital.
1. Equality in Consumer Bankruptcy
From a historical perspective, the possibility that equality might matter more
in consumer bankruptcy than in corporate cases is not farfetched. Although the
204 As with the reverse discrimination cases in the Supreme Court’s affirmative action
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J.) (describing a white male’s invocation of the Equal Protection Clause to challenge a
public medical school’s racial preferences in admissions).
205 To be sure, equality is a protean concept, and some conceptions of equality do contemplate more
incremental comparisons. But equality in the bankruptcy context has always been based on the formal equality
principle that equals should be treated equally, as construed in pro rata terms. The formal equality principle is
usually traced to Aristotle. See generally ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics (J.O. Urmson ed., W.D. Ross trans.),
in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1785 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (c. 349
B.C.E.) (noting that equality requires that if persons “are not equal, they will not have what is equal” and that
disorder emerges “when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares”).
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earliest bankruptcy laws were restricted to merchants and traders, these debtors
were usually individuals and partnerships. Starting in 1841, consumer debtors
could file for bankruptcy even if they were not merchants or traders.206 Like the
early consumer bankruptcy cases, the two-thirds of today’s consumer cases filed
under Chapter 7 fit the pattern from which the equality norm arose: the debtor
turns any assets over to the court so that the assets can be sold and the proceeds
distributed to creditors, and the debtor is then given a discharge.
In theory, most consumer cases thus hew closely to the equality of
creditors norm, with general creditors each receiving a portion of the payout.
The problem is that the payout is zero. Because most consumer debtors do
not have any nonexempt, unencumbered assets, general creditors often do not
receive a recovery.207 Equality of creditors has little meaning when creditors
are not receiving any recovery at all.
Moreover, and at least as important, equality of creditors is entirely unhelpful
when issues do arise. Perhaps the best illustration is the treatment of covenants
not to compete—a debtor’s contractual promise not to engage in business
activities that compete with her employer after their contract is
terminated—since this issue is often characterized as raising equality of creditors
concerns. Courts have wrestled with the question whether a debtor must comply
with a covenant not to compete that would be enforceable under state law, or
whether the debtor’s obligations should be treated as a claim that can be
discharged.208 The equality norm is sometimes viewed as suggesting that the
debtor should not (or should rarely) be bound by a covenant not to compete.209
The nondebtor should be treated like other general creditors, the reasoning goes,
and given an unsecured claim rather than specific enforcement of the covenant.
In reality, however, the equality norm is irrelevant to the analysis. From a
policy perspective, covenants not to compete lie at the intersection between
two key bankruptcy principles that do matter: the fresh start210 and the
commitment to honoring state law entitlements wherever possible.211
Declining to specifically enforce a covenant not to compete strengthens the
fresh start by removing constraints on the debtor’s ability to earn a living in
206
207
208

See supra text accompanying note 29.
See, e.g., ROBERT E. GINSBERG ET AL., GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY § 15.03 (2017).
The Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” to include a “right to an equitable remedy for breach
of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2012). The
difficulty arises because it is not clear just when a covenant not to compete “gives rise to a right to
payment” and thus can be treated as a dischargeable claim.
209 See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 82, at 245.
210 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“One of the primary purposes of the
bankruptcy act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh . . . .’” (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 556-55 (1915)).
211 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (holding state entitlements should be
honored in bankruptcy unless the law clearly indicated otherwise).
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the future, whereas specific enforcement more closely replicates the parties’
respective rights outside of bankruptcy.212 Even here, the equality norm is
unhelpful and unnecessary to the analysis.213
2. Equality in Chapter 7 Liquidation
Like consumer bankruptcy, Chapter 7 liquidation cases much more closely
resemble the conception of bankruptcy that gave rise to the equality of
creditors norm than most Chapter 11 cases do. When a debtor files for
Chapter 7, a trustee is appointed.214 The trustee sells the debtor’s assets and
distributes the assets to creditors.215
If there were a place where equality might continue to thrive, Chapter 7
appears to be the most likely candidate. Several of the principal deviations
from equality, such as critical vendor doctrine and sales that favor some
creditors over others, play much less of a role when a business is being
liquidated by a third party such as a trustee. And general creditors do
sometimes receive at least a limited recovery in business cases resolved under
Chapter 7. It is not hard to imagine a process where the debtor’s assets are
sold and the proceeds distributed in accordance with the equality norm.
Even here, however, the equality norm is obsolete. One problem with
retaining the equality norm in Chapter 7 is that distinctions between Chapter
7 and Chapter 11 would create serious frictions. If an equality-based preference
rule were retained in Chapter 7, for instance, but not in Chapter 11, some
creditors might do better and others worse in Chapter 7, which would invite
unproductive fights over converting from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, particularly
in cases that result in a liquidation of the debtor’s assets in Chapter 11.216
In addition, today’s Chapter 7 cases look very different from the
nineteenth century vision of creditor equality, which imagined that most or
all of a debtor’s creditors would be general creditors—all with the same
priority—and each would receive a pro rata share of the proceeds of the
debtor’s assets. To the extent there are unencumbered assets in a modern
212 Compare In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703, 712 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (treating a covenant not to
compete as a dischargeable claim), with In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1994) (enforcing a
covenant not to compete).
213 It also is a particularly bad fit, given that the real parties in interest are the debtor and the
creditor whose contract includes a covenant not to compete, not the general creditors vis-à-vis one
another. If there are no nonexempt assets, the other creditors have no stake in the dispute. If there
are assets, the “equality” result would give the existing creditors a lower payout if the case is filed
under Chapter 7, as most are, since the claim of the creditor with a covenant not to compete would
increase the amount of claims without altering the available assets.
214 See 11 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012).
215 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2012).
216 In my view, this is the principal difficulty with Brook Gotberg’s very intriguing proposal to enforce
preference law in Chapter 7 but not Chapter 11. See generally Gotberg, supra note 152.
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Chapter 7 case, the assets are rarely distributed equally. The largest creditor
is often the Internal Revenue Service, which enjoys a priority over other
general creditors.217 Other creditors may also claim a priority. The actual
distribution deviates quite markedly from the equality of creditors vision. If
lawmakers were committed to equality of creditors in Chapter 7, they would
need to significantly alter its structure. But there is no good reason to do so.
D. Pari Passu Treatment: The Last Redoubt of Equality of Creditors?
As we have seen, the equality norm is either perverse or unnecessary in every
context where it is thought to hold sway. Equality of creditors does seem to have
one last redoubt, however: the requirement that each creditor within a particular
class of claims or interests be given the same (“pari passu”) treatment.218 Surely,
one might assume, equality of creditors is still essential within classes of creditors.
Before we address the question directly, it is worth noting how tiny this
plot of ground is. The Bankruptcy Code itself removes numerous general
creditors from the pool by giving them special priority,219 thus largely
abandoning the old assumption that all of a debtor’s general creditors would
receive the same pro rata payment. As we have seen, the debtor itself can
remove still more claims by assuming the creditors’ contracts or putting them
in a separate class and giving that class a more favorable payout.220 Only the
claims that are left are subject to the equal treatment rule.221
Even within a class of claims, the Bankruptcy Code does not require that
the creditors be given identical treatment. The Code’s pari passu requirement
explicitly allows for differential treatment, so long as the holder of a claim
accepts this treatment.222 Chapter 11 debtors frequently take advantage of this
flexibility, offering creditors in a particular class of claims two or more options,
such as a choice between a cash payout and a different debt payout. Nor are
the options simply two different forms of the same payout. Often the value of
the options is discernibly different. Equal treatment does not hold sway at all.

217
218
219
220
221

See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2012).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2012).
§ 507(a).
11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2012).
The pari passu rule applies within each special priority and separate class, of course, but it would be
odd to suggest this is an illustration of equal treatment, given that these are exceptions to equal treatment. For
a similar argument, see Mokal, supra note 18, at 119, which notes the confusing phenomenon of “commentators
who regard the distribution to preferential creditors inter se to be governed by the pari passu principle, [but]
still accept that the existence of preferential claims itself constitutes an exception to that principle.”
222 § 1123(a)(4).
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In recent cases, debtors have taken this disparate treatment even further
through the use of restructuring support agreements.223 In a restructuring
support agreement, a creditor or group of creditors agrees to support a debtor’s
reorganization plan in return for specified concessions. These concessions may
be given to some members of a class of creditors but not others. In the Caesars
bankruptcy, for instance, the nondebtor parent corporation of the debtor agreed
to pay a fee to creditors that signed the restructuring support agreement.
Creditors who declined to sign the agreement would not be given the fee and
thus would receive a markedly lower payout than creditors who signed.224
There are reasons for concern about the rising use of restructuring
support agreements, but the equality of creditors norm is completely
unhelpful in identifying and addressing them. The real issues are self-dealing
and the risk that silencing a group of potentially active creditors will
undermine the reorganization process, leading to inefficient reorganization
outcomes.225 The equality norm is a poor proxy for these concerns.
Even apart from these visible departures from equality, the pari passu
treatment within a class of general unsecured claims masks important differences
among the creditors. 226 A creditor whose contract calls for 10% interest is treated
no differently than a creditor that has been promised 4%, for instance, and both
are in the same position as a creditor whose contract did not provide for
interest.227 This is yet another sign that the key principles lie elsewhere. Rather
than equality, more useful yardsticks are whether the treatment is fair, and
whether it is likely to maximize the efficiency of the bankruptcy process.228
223 The first and best treatment of restructuring support agreements in the scholarly literature
is Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017).
224 Id. at 609-10.
225 Id. The concern is analogous in important respects to vote buying in corporate law, which
is viewed with suspicion but permitted if, among other things, other shareholders approve. See, e.g.,
Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. Ch. 1982).
226 Thomas Jackson’s defense of the pari passu rule in his classic creditors’ bargain theory of
bankruptcy is instructive in this regard. Jackson defends the rule only as a second best—because of
the difficulty of determining which creditor would have won a race to the courthouse outside of
bankruptcy. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 29-33 (1986).
The absence of pressure to adopt a more refined rule may reflect the facts that general creditors
receive little or no payout in many cases and that creditors can protect themselves by taking a
security interest—rather than any particular virtue in the rule itself.
227 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2012) (authorizing interest payments only for oversecured creditors).
228 Not only is equality language outmoded and potentially counterproductive in the class treatment
context, but it may even have perverse implications for the initial issuance of bonds and other debt. When
debtors issue a class of bonds, they traditionally have promised pro rata treatment of each bond in the issuance.
In the past, it might have been too complicated to deviate from this norm in any significant way. But this is
no longer true. A debtor could easily issue a class of bonds that provided for different payouts, depending on
the subsequent performance of the company. Risk-averse investors might choose a low variance payout, while
risk-preferring investors could opt for a payout with higher upsides and downsides. These tailored payouts
could significantly increase the attractiveness of the bonds and thus reduce the debtor’s overall cost of credit.
The pari passu presumptions of the equality principle may have impeded these developments.
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V. IS ANYTHING LEFT FOR EQUALITY?
Although most critics of the Peter Westen article referenced in my title
acknowledged the force of some of his arguments, they insisted that equality
nevertheless plays an essential role in American law.229 Perhaps the same is true
here. Might equality serve a desirable function that I have not yet considered, as
seems to be the case in other contexts? I will answer that question in two steps:
first by briefly surveying some of the proposed benefits of equality arguments;
and then by considering whether they apply in the bankruptcy context.
A. The Role of an Equality Concept
While recognizing that equality relies on other principles for its content,
Westen’s critics insisted that the equality language nevertheless makes at least
three crucial contributions that would be lost if the norm were jettisoned.230
First, equality has a moral dimension that is distinct from other concepts,
such as justice or rights. The concept of equality “tells us that different
treatment of people does matter,” and it “forces us to consider how society
treats people in relationship to one another.”231
Second, the equality norm creates a beneficial presumption against
differential treatment. By introducing an expectation that people should be
treated in roughly the same way, equality “puts the burden of proof on those
who wish to impose differences in treatment,”232 thus assuring that equality
prevails unless there are good reasons for deviation. The principal
beneficiaries of the equality presumption are the powerless. “A presumption
of like rather than unlike treatment,” as one advocate put it, “requires the
dominant group to live by its own rules. No other principle so systematically
and comprehensively restrains the abuse of political power.”233
The third contribution is rhetorical. Equality language has an emotional
resonance that can shape our response to particular issues. Although it was
229 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 575, 582 (1983). Even Westen himself later came around to this view to some extent. See
PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY, at xix-xx (Marshall Cohen ed., 1990) (acknowledging
some potential benefits of equality analysis).
230 In addition to the contributions discussed in the text that follows, Kent Greenawalt argued that
equality can provide a separate basis for disallowing differential treatment in contexts where another
principle applies. See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1171-73
(1983). Westen responds to this argument, persuasively in my view, in his book, supra note 229, at 195-204.
231 Chemerinsky, supra note 229, at 585. This argument draws on Ronald Dworkin’s conception
of equality as a right to equal respect. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180
(1977) (describing “a right to equality” as “a right to equal concern and respect in the design and
administration of the political institutions that govern them”).
232 Chemerinsky, supra note 229, at 588.
233 Id. at 589.
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only one of many contributing factors, the language of “marriage equality”
seems to have played an important role in the startlingly rapid shift in
American culture from rejecting to embracing same sex marriage. Equality
arguments have a rhetorical power and cultural resonance that cannot easily
be replicated by appeals to other values.
B. The Bankruptcy Contrast
Outside of bankruptcy, many find these and other arguments in favor of
the equality principle persuasive. Yet whatever purchase these considerations
have elsewhere, the benefits completely disappear in the bankruptcy context.
In bankruptcy, the equality norm has all of the downsides that equality has in
other contexts, with none of its ostensible virtues.
Start with equality’s moral injunction that “different treatment of people
does matter.”234 This lesson quickly becomes muddled if we try to apply it in
bankruptcy. One problem is that the boundaries between those who are favored
and those who are not are far less stable in bankruptcy than elsewhere. With
race, sex, or sexual orientation discrimination, the categories are fairly clear.
The pursuit of equality is designed to ensure that individuals are treated on
their own merits, rather than being favored or disfavored because of their race
or other characteristics. In the late nineteenth century, it might have been
possible to speak in vaguely similar terms about the implications of equality in
bankruptcy. Debtors often favored, or were thought to favor, family members
and other local creditors at the expense of out-of-state creditors. Equal
treatment might ensure that debtors could not systemically favor local creditors
over distant ones. Over a century later, these categories no longer exist. We
cannot generalize in any meaningful way the categories of people or institutions
who will be favored or disfavored in the absence of an equality norm. Many of
us are debtors in one context, for instance, and creditors in another.
The boundaries are unstable in another way as well. A creditor can exit or avoid
the class of general creditors by requiring that the debtor provide collateral for the
obligation or by obtaining priority in another way, such as contracting with a
subsidiary with a clean balance sheet.235 So long as the creditor does not obtain
priority under the cloak of darkness, there is nothing wrong with contracting for
special treatment. Indeed, numerous courts and commentators have pointed out
that insisting on equality would be deeply unfair under these circumstances. As
Judge Friendly once wrote, “Equality among creditors who have lawfully bargained
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Chemerinsky, supra note 229, at 585.
See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of
Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (2013).
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for different treatment is not equity but its opposite.”236 Deviations from equality
simply are not inherently problematic in the same way as they are in other contexts.
Equality’s second function—allocating the burden of proof—is even more
unhelpful in bankruptcy. With an issue like employment or voting
discrimination, equality language may strengthen the cause of the powerless by
“requir[ing] the dominant group to live by its own rules.”237 In bankruptcy, the
lines are far less clear, as we have seen. Historically, the principal advocates of
equality were often strong, out-of-state creditors, not the weak and vulnerable.
More recently, bondholders have bemoaned departures that favored pension
beneficiaries. Like the out-of-state creditors of the nineteenth century, today’s
bondholders are strong creditors, not weak ones. Equality language provides
little of the prophylactic effect its advocates extol in other contexts.238
Not only is the presumption misplaced, by protecting creditors who do not
seem to need extra help, it also can have pernicious consequences. The starkest
examples are preference law and executory contracts.239 Equality language
seems to have played a central role in justifying the current preference rules,
for instance, with their sweeping invalidation of prebankruptcy payments. But
the current rules are costly, ineffective, and difficult to defend. Removing the
equality presumption might make it easier to adopt a more sensible approach
to policing problematic prebankruptcy behavior.
Finally, equality rhetoric no longer provides expressive benefits in bankruptcy.
Two centuries ago, equality language may have had real rhetorical value. Although
equality’s dictates seem to have been widely ignored in practice, appeals to equality
called debtors and creditors to transparency and evenhandedness. Today, these
concerns can addressed more directly, especially outside the individual and small
business context where the equality norm first emerged. As a result, equality has
much less resonance in bankruptcy than elsewhere.240 It does not have the same
rhetorical power, and other principles are adequate to counteract potential abuses.
A consideration of equality’s special virtues in other contexts does not
rehabilitate it in bankruptcy. To the contrary, it underscores the emptiness of
bankruptcy’s equality norm.
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Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring).
Chemerinsky, supra note 229, at 589.
For a somewhat similar point, see WESTEN, supra note 229, at 257-81, which argues that equality
language does benefit from the sometimes-problematic presumption that the equality position is desirable.
239 See supra text accompanying notes 161–67 (noting that “the equality norm appears to have
played a pernicious role in the twentieth century evolution of preference law”), and 185–88 (noting
the “current rule” related to executory contracts “has a socially inefficient spillover effect”).
240 Except, of course, where traditional equality issues are at stake, such as discrimination
against debtors based on race. For an overview of these problems, see generally A. Mechele
Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725 (2004), and David A. Skeel,
Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695 (2004).
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CONCLUSION
The equality of creditors norm dates back to bankruptcy’s earliest days in
America. It emerged most fully as a justification for retrieving prebankruptcy
transfers as preferences, and as an admonition about distributions in
individual and small business bankruptcy cases, but in the twentieth century
it spread throughout bankruptcy law more generally. It is often viewed as the
central principle of bankruptcy.
A century ago, the equality norm served as a plausible (though much debated)
proxy for concerns about discriminatory treatment of different groups of
creditors. The equality norm no longer plays anything like this role. In each of
the contexts in which it figures most prominently, the real normative issues are
preventing self-dealing or secret liens, or addressing other concerns, not equality.
If the rhetoric of equality served other purposes in bankruptcy, such as “telling
us that different treatment of people does matter,” the equality of creditors
language might still play a valuable role, despite the distortions it produces. But
it doesn’t. In bankruptcy, the equality norm has become a costly distraction.
Bankruptcy judges, professionals, and scholars would do well to foreswear the
language of equality, and direct their attention to the principles that still matter.

